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Today' s copyright concerns often center on the new digital 
technologies, especially the Internet and its friendly interface, the World 
Wide Web ("the Internet"). Even though the Internet is relatively new and 
poses new challenges for copyright law, "technology," as such, and a 
constant change in technology are certainly not new. To the contrary, 
inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs have been changing the landscape 
of American life ever since the country's founding. Not surprisingly, 
copyright law-having existed for almost as long1-has repeatedly had to 
accommodate new technologies over the two centuries of its existence. 
Congress has repeatedly stated its intention to make the Copyright Ace 
flexible enough to adapt to new technologies over time without requiring 
repeated amendments. Much of the talk in hearings for the 1909 Copyright 
1. The first Copyright Act was enacted in 1790. See generally Act of May 31, 1790, 
ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 
17 u.s.c. §§ 101-118 (1976)). 
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Ace focused on this goal, and even more of the hearings for the 1976 
Copyright Act4 focused on it as well. Yet, since its effective date of 1978, the 
most recent major copyright revision has been amended at least twenty-eight 
times, 5 more than once every year on average, and as of this writing, has just 
undergone some very significant amendments relating to new technology.6 
Something is out of kilter here. On the one hand, Congress has tried to 
make the Copyright Act flexible enough to survive technological change; on 
the other hand, every new technological change seems to lead to further 
amendments to the Copyright Act. Why is it so hard to make the Copyright 
Act flexible, particularly when Congress has declared that doing so is a 
signal value? 
Two reasons account for the failure of Congress to craft an enduring 
Copyright Act, though only the second of these is addressed here. The first 
reason is essentially a matter of politics: a Copyright Act written to survive 
significant technological change would necessarily be very broadly and 
generally worded. But broad and general language neither clearly requires 
the imposition of liability nor clearly renders a potential defendant immune 
3. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at 
17 u.s.c. §§ 101-914 (1994)). 
4. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 
101 (1994)). 
5. See Preface to the Copyright Act <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/ 
title17/preface.html> (the U.S. Copyright Office World Wide Web site). See also H.R. REP. 
No. 104-554, at 6 (1996) (stating "[s]ince 1976, Congress. regularly has had to address new 
issues, especially those raised by new technologies or new methods of exploitation. Each 
session of Congress has produced at least one major amendment to the Copyright Act"). 
6. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ["DMCA"], H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. 
(1998), signed into law by President William Clinton in the fall of 1998 as Pub. L. No. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. 101). The Copyright Office 
summarized the law as follows: 
The DMCA is divided into five titles: 
Title I ... implements the WIPO treaties. 
Title II ... creates limitations on the liability of online service providers for 
copyright infringement when engaging in certain types of activities. 
Title III ... creates an exemption for making a copy of a computer program 
by activating a computer for purposes of maintenance or repair. 
Title IV contains six miscellaneous provisious, relating to the functions of 
the Copyright Office, distance education, the exceptions in the Copyright Act 
for libraries and for making ephemeral recordings, "webcasting" of sound 
recordings on the Internet, and the applicability of collective bargaining 
agreement obligations in the case of transfers of rights in motion pictures. 
Title V ... creates a new form of protection for the design of vessel hulls. 
U.S. Copyright Office, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office 
Summary <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyrightllegislation/dmca.pdf> (emphasis in original). 
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from liability in a given context. Political interest groups therefore seek 
legislative provisions not only favorable to their interests, but provisions that 
clearly and unambiguously favor those interests. To accomplish the latter 
goal, those groups press Congress for narrow and specific statutory wording, 
wording that cannot be expected to survive much technological 
change. Conversely, the more general the language of an act-and hence the 
more likely that it is to survive a long while-the greater the incentive of 
• • 7 
mterest groups to oppose 1t. 
The second reason for Congress's failure is a matter of policy, however, 
and is within the scope of this article: Congress has perceived and hence 
tried to solve only one-fourth of the problem of copyright and new 
technologies-the other three-fourths have never been adequately addressed, 
let alone solved. The one-fourth of the problem that has been reasonably 
well solved is the issue of copyright's subject matter. At times, new 
technologies create new media for recording the creative expression of 
authors, such as photography, motion pictures, laser-etched disks, and so 
on. This kind of technological evolution has often in the past given rise to 
the corresponding issue of whether those new media should be protected by 
copyright. By and large, the 1976 Copyright Act avoided the questions-
and the need for repeated Copyright Act amendments-for future media by 
defining copyright's subject matter to be "works of authorship", something 
that is by definition an abstraction and independent of any particular medium 
of fixation. The three-fourths of the problem that has not been addressed 
makes up an enormous portion of the .issues that surround new technology 
and copyright. Those issues, first proposed in a report written for the United 
States Copyright Office, 8 include the following. 
7. For more on the politics of copyright revision, see Professor Litman's excellent 
analysis in Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 
275, 277 (1989), written 10 years ago and more timely than ever: 
Throughout its history, copyright law has had difficulty accommodating 
technological change. Although the substance of copyright legislation in this 
century has evolved from meetings among industry representatives whose 
avowed purpose was to draft legislation that provided for the future, the 
resulting statutes have done so poorly. The language of copyright statutes has 
been phrased in fact-specific language that has grown 
obsolete . . . . Whatever copyright statute has been on the books has been 
routinely, and justifiably, criticized as outmoded. In this article, I suggest that 
the nature of the legislative process we have relied on for copyright revision 
is largely to blame for those laws' deficiencies. 
!d. at 277 (citations omitted). 
8. I. TROTIER HARDY, PROJECT LoOKING FORWARD: SKETCHING THE FuTuRE OF 
COPYRIGHT IN A NETWORKED WORlD-FINAL REPORT 238 {1998) [hereinafter HARDY I] (source 
on file with author). 
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New subject matter. First, new technologies sometimes allow new 
forms of creative expression that are independent of any particular 
medium.9 These new forms of expression raise questions of copyright's 
subject matter that are not solved by the current Copyright Act's separation 
of copyrightable "works" from particular media because the issue has 
nothing to do with the particular medium of fixation. 1° For example, the 
hierarchy of menu commands that is part of many computer programs is a 
form of expression that can be fixed in a variety of media. 11 Yet, in early 
1996 the Supreme Court split four-to-four on the question of the 
copyrightability of menu command hierarchies.12 
Decentralized infringement. Second, technologies like photocopying 
and computers sometimes allow widespread noncommercial uses of 
copyrighted works in ways that would clearly be infringing if done on a large 
scale for commercial purposes.13 When they are done on a small scale, 
typically for noncommercial purposes, the issue arises whether these 
"decentralized infringements" should be legitimized as a fair use, considered 
to be infringements even if they are largely undetectable by copyright 
owners, declared to be non-infringing by Congress, or dealt with in some 
other way.14 
New uses. Finally, new technologies often create new ways of using 
existing copyrighted works.15 Radio in the early 1920s raised the issue 
whether music broadcasts infringed composers' performance rights, for 
example.16 Cable television in the 1960s similarly raised the issue whether 
retransmitting copyrighted television programs or movies infringed the 
copyright owner's performance rights. 17 
This article will summarize these three issues of copyright and new 
technologies, and then concentrate on the last, the "new-use" issue from the 
perspective of copyright as an incentive to creative efforts. The article will 
demonstrate that much of the affected parties' and Congress's understanding 
of the new-use issue is faulty because it is heavily biased toward the then 
present state of the technology in issue. A proper analysis of the issue 
requires thinking ahead. Some new-use technologies will eventually grow to 
supplant "old use" technologies and should therefore be required to pay 
9. /d. at 238. 
10. !d. 
11. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an 
equally divided court 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
12. !d. See also infra text accompanying notes 31-34. 
13. HARDY I, supra note 8, at 240. 
14. !d. at 241. 
15. !d. at 240. 
16. /d. 
17. !d. 
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royalties to preserve authors' incentives at their previous level. Other new-
use technologies may not grow to any particular importance, and 
consequently need not be required to pay royalties to preserve authors' 
incentives. Unfortunately, neither courts nor Congress can predict the future 
growth of a new technology in order to make this determination. The issue 
is then how to make a determination about a new-use technology's royalty 
obligation that depends on foretelling the future when the future cannot be 
foretold. 
This article proposes one answer to this apparently intractable problem 
by analyzing the issue in terms of the statistician's ''Typer· and ''Type ll'' 
errors. Essentially, this approach asks: "How bad could it be" if the 
copyright decision-maker (court or Congress) guesses wrongly about a new 
technology's future? If one type of wrong guess is likely to be less harmful 
than other types, than absent information to the contrary, that is the guess 
about the future that the decision-maker ought to make. Finally, this same 
analysis implies that in the absence of other information to the contrary, 
when courts or Congress face the issue of whether a copyright royalty 
obligation applies to a new-use technology, they should fmd that it does 
apply. 
I. NEW MEDIA AS SUBJECf MATIER 
The way we view copyright's "subject matter" has evolved over the two 
centuries of copyright law's existence. In 1790, the first copyright statute 
included "maps, charts, and books" within its protection.18 Although not 
expressly confined to tangible media-a court could always interpret "map" 
or "chart" or "book" in a broad and nonliteral way were the occasion to do 
so arise19-this statute nonetheless seemed to focus on tangible media as the 
object of copyright's protection. 
Over the succeeding two hundred years, the focus of copyright's subject 
became more varied, including some subject matters defined or phrased as 
tangible objects, and others suggesting more abstract types of works. In an 
1853 case, for example, the Supreme Court said clearly that copyright was 
an abstract right, thoroughly separate from any tangible embodiment: 
But from the consideration we have given to the case, we are 
satisfied that the property acquired by the sale in the engraved 
plate, and the copy-right of the map secured to the author under the 
18. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
19. See Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899) (stating "the word 'book' as used in 
the statute is not to be understood in its technical sense of a bound volume, but any species of 
publication which the author selects to embody his literary product"). 
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act of Congress, are altogether different and independent of each 
other, and have no necessary connection. The copy-right is an 
exclusive right to the multiplication of the copies, for the benefit of 
the author or his assigns, disconnected from the plate, or any other 
physical existence. It is an incorporeal right to print and publish 
the map, or, as said by Lord Mansfield in Millar v. Taylor (4 
Burr. 2396) "a property in notion, and has no corporeal tangible 
substance. "20 
Yet when Congress added photography to copyright's subject matter in 
1865, it used words that focused on the medium itself: protection applied to 
"photographic prints."21 On the other hand, musical compositions were for 
years registered by the Copyright Office in the category of "books,"22 a 
practice that implied a recognition of "music" as a more abstract entity, 
capable of being fixed in a variety of forms. Congress only exwessly added 
"musical compositions" to copyright's subject matter in 1831. "Dramatic 
works" were added to the statute as a category in 1856,24 another phrase 
suggesting a focus on the abstract work regardless of its medium of 
fixation. Yet, this abstract sounding focus was not so broad that it was 
thought expressly to include "o:Eeratic compositions," a subject matter only 
added to the statute in 1894. Moreover, in 1908 the Supreme Court 
declared without reservation that copyright's subject matter consisted only 
of tangible media: 
20. Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528,530 (1852). 
21. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540. Interestingly, the issue of photography 
as a new type of copyrightable subject matter was litigated a year later, in 1866, on facts that 
had arisen before passage of the 1865 Act. See Wood v. Abbott, 30 F. Cas. 424, 425 
(S.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 17,938). The court concluded that photographs did not fit within any of 
the existing categories of protectible subject matter and hence were not copyrightable. /d. 
22. See Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 
60th Cong. (1908) (statement of Albert H. Walker), reprinted in E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI & 
ABE GolDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHf Acr (1976) [hereinafter 
BRYLA WSKI] Part K at 46 (noting that English courts had protected sheet music as "books" 
since 1777, and that American courts had always followed that precedent). 
23. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,4 Stat. 436. 
24. See Act of Aug. 18, 1956, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (1856). 
25. See H.R. 6835, 53d Cong. § 4966 (1894). Apparently Congress omitted "operatic 
compositions" from the category of "dramatic works" from simple oversight. See JAMES W. 
COVERT, AMENDING THE COPYRIGHf LAW, H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 1 (stating "the omission to 
include protective provisions for operatic compositions in the law sought to be amended [in 
1856] was, doubtless, the result of oversight"). 
1999] Hardy 
The statute has not provided for the protection of the intellectual 
conception apart from the thing produced, however meritorious 
such conception may be, but has provided for the making and filing 
of a tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which 
it is the purpose of the statute to protect .... 26 
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Finally, in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress formally adopted the 
"meritorious conception" that was rejected sixty-eight years earlier by the 
Supreme Court, namely that copyright's subject matter is abstract "works of 
authorship" regardless of the medium of a work's flxation.27 By 
"generalizing" copyright's subject matter that way, Congress hoped to 
permit copyright law more gracefully to accommodate technological 
change-to apply to new media of fixation, whether "now known or later 
developed."28 Relative to other issues of copyright and new technology, 
Congress has succeeded reasonably well in that endeavor?9 To the author's 
knowledge, no issues of copyright subject matter have arisen over "video 
26. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908). Apparently 
contra is the ten-years' earlier opinion in Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899) (stating: 
''It is the intellectual production of the author which the copyright protects and not the 
particular form which such production ultimately takes" though the Court may have intended 
"form" to refer to some form of paper publication). 
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). 
28. !d. 
29. But see HARDY I, supra note 8, at 246 stating: 
Even under the 1976 Act, subject matter issues that spring from new media of 
fixation have not always been resolved as cleanly and simply as the statutory 
language suggests. Notably in the 1980's, it took a major, highly contested 
case, Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corporation, [714 F.2d 1240 
(3rd Cir. 1983)], to determine that although computer programs written on 
paper or on a disk were the subject matter of copyright, so were computer 
programs fixed in read-only memory. One would have thought that the 
"medium-neutral" design of the 1976 Act would have made this an easy 
answer to reach. 
Id. See also Matthew Bender & Co., v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998), where 
despite its claims to the contrary, the Second Circuit returned to putting copyright's subject 
matter focus on the particular medium of fixation instead of the abstract work that results from 
"selection and arrangement." Id. at 703. 
/d. 
But the relevant statutory wording refers to material objects in which "a 
work" readable by technology "is fixed," not to another work or works that 
can be created, unbidden, by using technology to alter the fixed embedding of 
the work, by rearrangement or otherwise. The natural reading of the statute is 
that the arrangement of the work is the one that can be perceived by a 
machine without an uninvited manipulation of the data. 
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cassettes," "audio CDs," "CD-ROMs," "laser disks," "DVD disks," "DIVX 
videos," three-dimensional photographs in holograms, or over any other 
modern developments in media technology. That such disputes have not 
arisen is a tribute to Congress's wisdom in abstracting copyright's subject 
matter away from the medium of fixation. 
II. NEW WORKS AS SUBJECf MATIER 
Tributes pretty much have to stop with Congress's handling of the 
medium-of-fixation issue, alas. Less successfully treated in the Copyright 
Act is the issue of whether new types of works should be treated as 
copyrightable subject matter.30 The First Circuit's decision in Lotus 
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc}' a case involving the 
question of extending protection to the menu command structure of a 
computer program, illustrates the problem.32 
Lotus had developed the widely used computer spreadsheet program 
known as "Lotus 1-2-3." 
Lotus 1-2-3 is a spreadsheet program that enables users to perform 
accounting functions electronically on a computer. Users 
manipulate and control the program via a series of menu 
commands, such as "Copy," "Print," and "Quit." Users choose 
commands either by highlighting them on the screen or by typing 
their first letter. In all, Lotus 1-2-3 has 469 commands arranged 
into more than 50 menus and submenus?3 
Competing software company Borland developed its own spreadsheet 
program, "Quattro," which could make use of the same menu commands-
indeed, Quattro had implemented '"a virtually identical copy of the entire 1-
2-3 menu tree"' though with a different on-screen appearance.34 Lotus sued 
Borland, arguing that Borland had infringed Lotus's copyright in hierarchy 
30. 17 u.s.c. § 103 (1994). 
31. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affinned by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 
(1996). 
32. !d. at 810. 
33. !d. at 809. 
34. !d. at 810 (quoting Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 212 
(D. Mass. 1993) (emphasis in original)). 
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of menu commands. The First Circuit concluded that the menu hierarchy 
was a "method of operation"-something not copyrightable by defmition. 35 
A more useful way of looking at the case, though, is to see it as an issue 
of new subject matter. Personal computers and the software sold for them 
constituted a new technology that led to a new type of authorial effort, the 
creation of a computer program's "menu hierarchy." The fundamental issue 
in the case was whether copyright law should recognize that type of 
authorship as an appropriate type of subject matter for protection.36 
The issue arises because of ambiguity in the statutory 
language. Section 102 defmes tWo things: things that copyright protects as 
subject matter, and things that copyright does not protect as subject 
matter.37 These twin provisions, intended no doubt to serve as an abundance 
of caution in ensuring that the Copyright Act withholds copyright protection 
from ideas, facts, and the like, actually open up a middle ground of 
uncertainty. If there were but a single defmition of what is copyright's 
subject matter, courts would focus on new types of works with but a single 
question: Does this type of work fall within that definition of subject 
matter? With two defmitions, one inclusive and one exclusive, the Lotus 
court understandably felt obliged to ask three questions: Does the new type 
of work fall within the definition of copyrightable subject matter? Does the 
work also fall within the definition of non-copyrightable subject 
matter? And fmally, what is the effect of a work's falling within both 
categories of expressly protected and expressly unprotected subject matter? 
Lotus apparently concluded that a computer program's menu hierarchy did in 
fact fall within both categories: 
[W]hile original expression is necessary for copyright protection 
[that is, falls within copyright's included subject matter], we do not 
think that it is alone sufficient. Courts must still inquire whether 
original expression falls within one of the categories foreclosed 
from copyright protection by [section] 102(b) [that is, falls within 
copyright's excluded subject matter], such as being a "method of 
operation."38 
35. /d. at 815. The Copyright Act, section 102(b), notes: "'In no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any ... method of operation."' Lotus, 
49 F.3d at 815 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)). 
36. /d. at 813. 
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1994). 
38. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818. 
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The court implicitly found that falling within both categories meant that the 
new type of work, menu command hierarchies, was not eligible for 
0 h' 0 39 copyng t s protect10n. 
ill. THE "DECENTRALIZED INFRINGEMENT" ISSUE 
One major problem in copyright enforcement today is the fact that 
many modem communications technologies exhibit very low reproduction 
costs. Low costs mean that small firms, or even individuals, can make low 
volume copies without coming to the attention of copyright holders. When 
copying costs are high, infringement tends to be "centralized" because 
economies of scale dictate that a business enterprise-a store, a copy 
center-provide the copying equipment. Business enterprises are few 
enough in number, and visible enough through advertising, that copyright 
holders can locate and bargain with them. 
Before the invention of mimeography and xerography, for example, the 
copying of books or other printed matter would have to be undertaken by 
hand, a severe practical limit, or by a printer. Printing required typesetting, 
an expensive and time-consuming process. Because of the high initial 
overhead of printing, copying would not be worth undertaking unless a fairly 
large run of books was envisioned. A large run of books by a commercial 
printer would constitute a "centralized" infringement and would be relatively 
visible to a copyright holder: 
The unauthorized publication of a copyrighted book may ordinarily 
be adequately punished through civil proceedings and under the 
provisions of existing law. The offender in such case is ordinarily 
a person of fixed habitat, and has a press and the implements of his 
business. The ordinary processes of the courts may readily be 
served upon him, and he may be compelled to respond in damages 
fi h. d 0 40 or IS wrong omg. 
When technology reduces the costs of copying, the phenomenon of 
"decentralized infringement" results: individuals can duplicate copyrighted 
works in a way that is not easily detected by the copyright holder. Today, 
high quality copies can be made in low volume by ubiquitous photocopy 
machines. Such copying takes no overhead, little time, and even the 
machinery is priced low enough for home use, where the copying is 
essentially invisible to a copyright holder. 
39. /d.at819. 
40. See COVERT, supra note 25, at 2. 
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The photocopier and the video recorder are obvious examples of 
dramatically lowered costs over printing presses and television studios for 
the making of copies of paper documents and television 
programs. Similarly, the falling cost of home audio taping equipment in the 
form of tape cassettes during the 1960s and 1970s allowed individuals to 
make high quality copies of sound recordings that previously could only be 
made with expensive reel-to-reel tape machines in professional sound 
studios. Making such copies was lawful under federal law until1972.41 
Decentralized infringement is not confmed to physical reproduction of 
copyrighted materials. The distribution right42 can also be affected by 
technology. Today's computer networks and electronic mail provide an easy 
way to distribute information to literally millions of Internet users. In spite 
of recent amendments to the Copyright Act43 to deal with digitized music, 
new developments in digital audio and the Internet raise the familiar issue of 
decentralized infringement once again. 
Music has been available in a digital format in the form of audio 
"compact disks" or "CDs" for many years.44 For some years, it was far from 
easy for home users to make a copy of the digital audio data resident on a 
CD. CD players and computers with CD-ROM drives converted the digital 
format to analog immediately upon use. Consequently, home audio taping 
equipment that was used to copy a CD produced an analog tape recording, 
one that would decline in quality with multiple generations of subsequent 
copies. Both home audio equipment and computer CD-ROM drives today, 
however, are commonly able to copy the digital format directly, without 
conversion to analog form. Readily available software can read the digital 
files from a CD and copy them onto a personal computer's hard disk.45 
41. See Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
l(f)); see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (discussing California's state-law 
approach to the problem). 
42. The Copyright Act confers several defined rights on copyright owners: 
reproduction, distribution, public performance, public display, and the preparation of 
derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). 
43. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994) (codifying the Audio Home Recording Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4327 (1992)). 
44. The Philips Corporation introduced the first CD system in 1979. Sony followed 
with improvements to the Philips design in 1983. RUSSEU. SANJEK & DAVID SANJEK, 
AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC BUSINESS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 241 (1991). 
45. See, e.g., Audio grabber <http://www.audiograbber.com-us.net> (stating: 
Audiograbber is a beautiful piece of software that grabs digital audio 
from cd's. It copies the audio digitally- not through the soundcard- which 
enables you to make perfect copies of the originals. It can even perform a test 
to see that the copies really are perfect. Audiograbber can also automatically 
normalize the music, delete silence from the start and/or end of tracks .... ). 
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However, the resulting computer files are quite large.46 For most home 
users, wide-spread distribution of such files electronically over the Internet 
would be impracticably time consuming.47 However, a compression 
technology called "MP3" has arisen that reduces the sizes of such files by a 
factor of ten, with little or no noticeable loss in music quality.48 This 
combination of copying and compression technologies has resulted in the 
rapid spread of nonprofessional Internet sites that feature digitized music for 
downloading, typically copied from CDs.49 This development now threatens 
to decentralize the formerly highly centralized system for the distribution of 
recorded music.50 
46. CD music occupies roughly 10 million bytes of computer storage per minute of 
playing time. A three minute song, for example, copied to one's computer hard disk would 
take up roughly 30 megabytes of disk storage. 
47. A typical home-to-Internet connection today operates at 28.8 kilobits per 
second. At that speed, downloading or uploading a three-minute song, about 30 million bytes 
(which at eight bits per byte equals 240 million bits), would take roughly 140 minutes or over 
two hours (that is 240 million bits divided by 28,800 bits per second which equals 8333 
seconds). Obviously, anything that speeded up such downloading-other things being 
equal-would increase the amount of such downloading. Faster modems or other access 
technologies would do it; smaller file sizes would also do it. It happens that the latter came 
first. 
48. See Jason Chervokas, Music Industry Fears Digital Music Pirates 
<http://search.nytimes.com/books/search/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber -lib+cyberlib+ 20671 + 3+w 
AAA+mp3> (source on file with author). See also David Thorn, MPEG Audio FAQ Version 
9 <http://www.tnt.uni-hannover.de/project/mpeg/audio/faq/> (source on file with author). 
49. The Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") refers to these non-
professional sites as "Music Archive Sites," defining them as sites that 
host an inventory of full-length sound recordings for Internet users to 
download and play and in some cases upload as well. Music Archive Sites 
may contain hundreds of full-length sound recordings that, for the most part, 
are of near CD quality. The sites often actively encourage -- sometimes 
require-- users to upload additional full-length sound recordings to the site in 
exchange for being able to download. 
RIAA, Record Industry Protects Copyrighted Sound Recordings On the Internet: 
Enforcement Campaign Expands, Music Archive Sites Targeted <http://www.riaa.com/ 
antipir/releases/maslit.htm>. 
50. See, e.g., Jon Pareles, With A Click, A New Era of Music Dawns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
15, 1998, at AR-1 (stating: "Digital distribution is likely to revolutionize the economics of the 
music business. Some advantages of large recording companies, like their centralized 
manufacturing and distribution and their domination of retail display space, vanish if the 
Internet becomes the main outlet for music") (emphasis added). These new music distribution 
technologies have strong analogies to jukeboxes, radio, retail CD stores, and so on, suggesting 
that courts will find that distributing music in this particular form will be infringing. Yet, on 
October 26, 1998, federal district court Judge Audrey B. Collins denied the recording 
industry's motion for a preliminary injunction against the sale of a device for storing music in 
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These previous illustrations feature changing costs making certain uses 
of works so cheap that they are no longer centralized and hence no longer 
"visible" or readily controllable by copyright owners. This phenomenon can 
arise even without sophisticated technology. Early in the twentieth century, 
witnesses in copyright hearings testified about the difficulty of rmding and 
suing professional play pirates, who operated in this fashion: 
An expert stenographer secretes himself somewhere in the theater 
and he takes down word for word everything that is spoken in the 
play . . . . After he has gotten all that, he takes down the makeup of 
the actor, everything he wears, the arrangement of the face, the 
beard or wig if he wears one, the costume. Then he comes down to 
the scenery; the properties that are used. All of the play is stolen in 
that way. 
How does he get that stolen manuscript on the market? He does 
not put out a sign "Play broker," ''Play agent," as a reputable 
vendor of manuscripts would do. But he has in front a beer 
saloon. You enter ostensibly to get a glass of beer. What you go 
for is to get the play. By knocking on a door or by some other 
means you obtain access to the manuscript room, and you get a 
copy for $5.51 
Another witness similarly complained about the difficulty of enforcing 
play copyrights when unauthorized "performances are usually given at points 
remote from the location or headquarters of the dramatic author or producer, 
and by irresponsible persons, who jump their companies nightly from town 
to town."52 Obviously, modern digital technology had nothing to do with 
these nineteenth to early twentieth century play performances. Rather, the 
its MP3 fonnat. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 29 F. 
Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Actions against private individuals for "decentralized 
infringement" in the fonn of copying MP3 files may be foreclosed by the digital audio 
amendments to the Copyright Act made in 1992. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994). 
51. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th 
Cong. (1908), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Kat 22 (statement of Harry P. 
Mawson, representing the American Dramatists' Club). 
52. /d. at 24 (statement of Ligon Johnson, representing the National Association of 
Theatrical Managers). Similarly, the 19th century saw the wide-spread unauthorized 
reproduction and distribution of sheet music. Canadian music publishers maintained secret 
publishing houses in the United States. They sent thousands of salesmen out with trunks of 
sheet music, keeping only a few sheets at recognized warehouses so that they could not be 
caught with much on hand. See H.R. REP. No. 1289-55. 
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problem grew from the fact that the performances, at least when done with 
limited props and scenery, had only small economies of scale and could 
therefore be produced with a small number of people and equipment and 
hence in a decentralized fashion. 
Courts and Congress have responded to the decentralized infringement 
issue in a variety of ways. At times, stiff penalties have been imposed on the 
conduct;53 at times, Congress has adopted a compulsory license with 
prescribed payments;54 at times, private parties have worked out their own 
arrangements in the form of "guidelines;"55 at times, Congress has rendered 
the activities immune, perhaps in exchange for a tax/royalty on some related 
activity;56 at times, one who facilitates decentralized infringement has been 
found liable for contributory infringement;57 at times, a court has declared 
the activity to be a fair use.58 And doubtless, at times, the activity in 
question continues, undetected, without litigation, and hence without any 
definitive resolution of the infringement question. 
N. THENEW-USEISSUE 
All three problems so far discussed-new media of fixation, new types 
of works, and decentralized infringement-raise challenges for copyright 
law and merit thoughtful analysis. But the fourth problem is perhaps the 
most vexing of all: new technologies that create a new way of using existing 
copyrighted works. In short, these technologies raise the new-use question: 
Does the new-use of an existing copyrighted work infringe the author's 
rights? An abundance of illustrations has emerged from copyright cases 
over the last century or so. 
For example, musical compositions as such were copyrightable after 
1831, well before the advent of radio in the 1920s. When radio stations 
began playing musical compositions "on the air," however, litigation soon 
arose over whether such a playing constituted a "performance for profit" of 
53. See Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 482 (amending 60 R.S. ch. 3) (imposing 
prison sentences for unauthorized play performances). 
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (compulsory license for the making of "cover records"). 
55. See Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law Revision, Authors League of America, 
and Association of American Publishers, Inc., Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom 
Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, 
reprinted in HOUSE REPORT ON COPYRIGHf Acr OF 1976, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 159-60, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5775-76 [hereinafter House Report]. 
56. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003, 1004 (1994) (tax on digital recording devices and media). 
57. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 
905 (E.D. Mich. 1994), rev'd, 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir. 1996), reh'g en bane and opinion 
vacated, 74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'd 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
58. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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the composition-and hence a copyright infringement under the 1909 
Copyright Act. 
The same question arose after the arrival of cable television in the 
1960s. Cable television began as a means of strengthening the signal of 
distant broadcast stations, especially in the valleys of mountainous 
areas. These cable stations picked up broadcast signals from the airwaves 
and passed them along to cable subscribers without seeking permission from 
the broadcast stations or paying royalties. Again, litigation arose over 
whether such retransmission by cable constituted a "public performance for 
profit" within the scope of the copyright owner's rights. 
A Phonograph Recording 
Composers of the 1900s era wanted to be able to collect royalties from 
phonograph and piano roll companies that hired orchestras to record their 
compositions. Most copyright scholars know that the Supreme Court 
rejected that desire in 1908, when the Court decided the White-Smith Music 
Publishing. Co. v. Apollo Co. 59 case. White-Smith held that the use of 
copyrighted music on piano rolls, a popular technology of the day,60 did not 
infringe the composer's copyright rights.61 Less well-known, perhaps, is that 
the Supreme Court rested its decision partly on that fact that a number of 
earlier lower court cases had declined to offer copyright protection to 
recorded sound; Congress, with presumed awareness of those decisions, had 
not acted to change that result.62 . 
!d. 
59. 209 u.s. 1 (1908). 
60. !d. at 9. 
The record discloses that in the year 1902 from seventy to seventy-five 
thousand of such instruments were in use in the United States, and that from 
one million to one million and a half of such perforated musical rolls ... were 
made in this country in that year. 
It is evident that the question involved in the use of such rolls is one of 
very considerable importance, involving large property interests, and closely 
touching the rights of composers and music publishers. 
61. /d. at 18. 
62. /d. at 12-14. 
[I]t must be admitted that the decisions, so far as brought to our attention in 
the full discussion had at the bar and upon the briefs, have been uniformly to 
the effect that these perforated rolls operated in connection with mechanical 
devices for the production of music are not within the copyright act. 
White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 12. 
Since these cases were decided Congress has repeatedly had occasion to 
amend the copyright law. The English cases, the decision of the District 
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The real story was a bit more circular. True, the early cases of recorded 
music found no infringement. In 1888, a Massachusetts case, Kennedy 
v. McTammany,63 found that the reproduction of music in the form of 
perforated paper rolls for "organette" hand organs64 did not infringe 
composers' copyrights because it was not a "copy" of the comEosition for 
copyright purposes.65 A similar case in 1901, Stern v. Rosey, 6 relied on 
Kennedy to conclude that a phonograph record was similarly not a copy of 
the musical composition it recorded.67 Within just a few years of that 
decision, Congress began considering a major revision of the Copyri&ht 
Act. By the time the first Congressional hearings began in June, 1906, a 
bill had already been introduced that provided music composers the right to 
control the reproduction of their works in the form of recorded sounds: 
[T]he copyright secured by this Act shall include the sole and 
exclusive right ... 
(g) To make, sell, distribute, or let for hire any device, 
contrivance, or appliance especially adapted in any manner 
whatsoever to reproduce to the ear the whole or any material part 
of any work published and copyrighted after this Act shall have 
gone into effect, or by means of any such device or appliance 
Court of Appeals, and Judge Colt's decision must have been well known to 
the members of Congress ... the omission of Congress to specifically 
legislate concerning them might well be taken to be an acquiescence in the 
judicial construction given to the copyright laws. 
!d. at 14. 
63. 33 F. 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888). 
64. For a brief history of organettes, see Peter Schmidt, History of Organettes 
<http://www.actionwebcreations.com/srnr/history.htm>, where one learns that John 
McTammany-presumably the defendant in the case cited-was the inventor of the devices. 
!d. Schmidt himself is evidently a collector of antique organettes. !d. 
65. Kennedy, 33 F. at 584. 
66. 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901). 
67. !d. at 565. 
68. Three hearings took place: in June of 1906; again in December of that year; and 
finally, in March of 1908. See Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint 
Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. (1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Hat 102; 
Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. 
(1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part J at 276; Revision of Copyright Laws: 
Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th Cong. (1908), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, 
supra note 22, Part K at 46. 
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publicly to reproduce to the ear the whole or any material part of 
such work .... 69 
675 
The bill proved controversial, with the "authors" (composers and 
publishers) favoring it, and "users" (piano roll and phonograph 
manufacturers) opposing it. In classic fashion, though, both sides to the 
debate focused on the effect of the new technology on the market for the old 
technology, without so much as a nod to the possibility that the new 
technology might itself become a major market one day. In the case of 
recorded sound, the old market was for the sale of sheet music to individuals 
and to orchestras and bands for live performances.70 Accordingly, much 
testimony centered on sheet music sales: Whether a composer's right to 
control the making of recordings would help or hurt the composer's income 
from the sale of sheet music.71 As it turned out, in a very few years several 
phonograph recording companies would earn phenomenal amounts of money 
69. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th 
Cong. (1906), reprinted in BRYIAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Hat v (1976). 
70. KERRY SEGRAVE, PAYOLA IN TilE MUSIC INDUSTRY: A HISTORY, 1880-1991 3 
(1994). ''In those days [the late 19th century], of course, it was the sale of sheet music that 
was the sole so~rce of income for the [music publishing] companies •••. Records would not 
become a major factor for several more decades." !d. 
71. See, e.g., BRYIAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Hat 325 (statement of Paul H. Cromelin, 
representing the Columbia Phonograph Company). Mr. Cromelin stated that the operators of 
a penny arcade that featured coin operated player pianos: 
are being paid by certain music publishers for displaying ads of certain 
compositions over the automatic piano or piano player which is used to attract 
the public. 
It seems to us that this would amply demonstrate the fact that publishers 
and composers consider the piano player an advantageous medium to increase 
the sale of their compositions. 
/d. at 325 (statement of Paul H. Cromelin, representing the Columbia Phonograph Company) 
Why does [one of several well known music publishers], who claim that we 
are stealing the product of the composers' brains, use .•. us and paying [sic] 
for 250 to 300 records of every song as soon as they publish it? For the 
purpose of selling the records? No-absolutely not-but to give them away 
to the owners of penny arcades in consideration of their putting them on their 
automatic graphophones, so that the public will become acquainted with the 
tune and buy the sheet music. 
ld. at 326. ''We claim, gentlemen, that there has been no more potent influence than the 
talking machine and the piano player and these various mechanical devices in bringing about 
an increase in sheet music sales of 163 percent in six years." ld. at 333. 
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from record sales;72 however, this possibility was remote from the 
discussions. 
In any event, Congress and various industry representatives continued 
to thrash the music issue throughout the hearings, initially without sign of 
any resolution. By the last round of hearings, in March of 1908, the 
Supreme Court had just a month earlier issued its decision in the White-
Smith case.73 As already noted, the Court-relying heavily on the fact that 
Congress itself had not amended the statute--concluded that under the 
statute as it then stood, composers had no right to control recordings of their 
works.74 
The Court had deferred to Congress-which then deferred back to the 
Court.75 Representative Currier observed that composer Victor Herbert, 
whose views doubtless represented a great many other composers, was 
"asking us to create for him an absolutely new prope~ right, which the 
Supreme Court says has absolutely no existence." 6 Representative 
Barchfeld added that "[y ]ou are coming to Congress and asking for 
additional legislation to give you a right which the law does not now give 
you. The Supreme Court has declared that you have no standing in court."11 
The issue had become a mutual finger-pointing exercise, with the 
Supreme Court unwilling to create or recognize rights that Congress had not 
chosen to create or recognize, and the Congress apparently unwilling to 
create or recognize rights that the Supreme Court had not chosen to create or 
recognize. Whereas at an earlier point, a bill to grant rights to composers 
might have seemed unremarkable, after the Supreme Court's decision, such a 
bill seemed to fly in the face of established authority. With this posture, the 
hearings took on the quality of a stalemate. 
72. Between 1902 and 1917, assets of the Victor Talking Machine Company, 
predecessor to the RCA Victor company, went from $2.7 million to $33.2 million, a twelve-
fold increase. The company's founder, Eldridge Johnson, "had become a tycoon; and several 
of the men whose careers dated back to the founding of the company were millionaires, or 
well on their way." ROLAND GEUATI, THE FABULOUS PHONOGRAPH: FROM EDISON TO 
STEREO 151 (1965). And this was at a time, 1910, when one dollar "would buy a seven-
course dinner at a first-class restaurant." /d. at 149. The British recording company, 
Gramaphone, saw its net profits rise from £79,348 in 1901 to £137,268 in 1902 and to 
£252,285 (over $1 million) in 1903. /d. at 122. 
73. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
74. /d. at 14. 
75. /d. 
76. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th 
Cong. (1908), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part K at 193 (comment of 
Representative Currier) (emphasis added). 
77. /d. (comments of Representative Barchfeld) (emphasis added). 
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A stalemate leads Congress to compromise. In the fmal round of 
hearings, members and witnesses seized on the proposal to establish a 
"com~ulsory license" as a compromise between full copyright rights and 
none. 8 A compulsory license meant that composers would receive a non-
negotiated, statutorily prescribed royalty when their compositions were 
recorded more than once.79 Hearings participants fmally struck an 
agreement on a compulsol]o license some time after the hearings closed. In 
short order, it became law. 0 
History now shows us that notwithstanding the vigorous discussion at 
the hearings about how recorded music would boost the sale of sheet music, 
the sheet music market soon withered under the dual onslaught of the 
phonograph and later the radio.81 Today, music in the home almost 
78. In addition to the Supreme Court's ruling in the White-Smith case, the compulsory 
license provision in the 1909 Copyright Act was also inspired by fears of a recording industry 
monopoly. A leading piano roll company of the day, the 1Eolian Company, had signed 
contracts with many music publishers that would have granted 1Eolian exclusive rights to the 
music for which copyright was held by the publishers. These contracts were conditioned upon 
either the Supreme Court or Congress declaring that recording music without permission was 
an infringement of the composers' rights. By the end of 1906, about 500 publishers had 
signed such contracts. A number of music publishers, in other words, had signed contracts 
that would be ineffective if copyright were found not to apply to sound recordings, but would 
automatically transfer copyright permissions to 1Eolian if copyright were found to apply. See 
Revision of Copyright lAws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. 
(1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part J at 277-80 (statement of Albert H. 
Walker). 
79. Composers were not obliged to permit any recording of their compositions. 
However, having once voluntarily negotiated with a recording company to permit recording, 
composers were then subject to the compulsory license provision: other recording companies 
could record the same composition on payment of the statutorily prescribed fee whether the 
composer liked it or not. 
80. Representative Currier introduced a bill that included the compulsory license 
provision on March 2, 1909. See H.R. 28192 § 1(e), included in H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th 
Cong. (1909), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part S at 22-24 (1976). The bill 
specified a compulsory royalty of two cents per record for anyone to record compositions that 
had already been licensed by the composer for recording. The next day it passed in both the 
House and the Senate. See 43 CONG REC. 3768-69 (1909) (House version); 43 CONG REC. 
3744 (1909) (Senate version). President Roosevelt signed it the following day, March 4. See 
43 CONG REC. 3831-32 (1909). 
81. A turning point of sorts was around 1921, when music publishing companies first 
began releasing compositions to phonograph recording companies before exhausting sheet 
music sales. See SANJEK & SANJEK supra note 44, at 20. By 1924, roughly seven to eight 
million phonographs were in use, compared with about five million pianos and less than a 
million player pianos. Copyrights: Hearings on H.R. 6250 and H.R. 9137 Before the House 
Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. (1924) (statement of E. C. Mills). As one commentator noted 
about the wildly popular ''Victrola" phonograph machine introduced in 1906, "[o]nce, a piano 
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invariably means radio or recorded music, the income from which easily 
dwarfs that of sheet music sales. 82 Congress, in short, was terribly wrong in 
its assessment of the role that recorded music would come to play in 
American life-and accordingly in its assessment of the relative significance 
of recorded music and sheet music for copyright law. 
B. Motion Pictures 
Invented toward the end of the 19th century,83 motion pictures were 
confirmed as copyrightable subject matter by an appellate court in 1903.84 
had graced the parlor of the middle-class home and gave it an air of refinement and 
culture. Now a fine Victrola and a collection of the exclusive Victor Red Seal records made 
the same statement." ANDRE MILLARD, AMERICA ON REcORD: A HISfORY OF REcORDED 
SouND 131 (1995). Later, it was radio that nearly drove the phonograph recording business 
out of business. Sharply improved sound quality boosted sales of radio receivers in the "radio 
Christmas" season of 1924; in that same year, sales of phonograph record players from the 
Victor company dropped 60%, and those of Edison's company dropped more than 50%. /d. 
at 138. See also GELATI, supra note 72, at 265 (stating "by January 1933, the record business 
in America was practically extinct"). Jukeboxes were largely responsible for rescuing the 
recorded music industry: in 1936, over half of all records were produced for the jukebox 
market. MILLARD, supra at 169. In the ironic flip-flops that have characterized the 
commercialization of sound technology, radio broadcasting went into decline when television 
began to usurp the market for live musical and variety performances in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. Phonograph records in part accounted for radio's reemergence as an important 
medium for music. MICHAEL FINK, INSIDE THE MUSIC BUSINESS 14 (1989) (stating "[r]adio, 
which in the early 1920s had nearly destroyed the record business, now owed its own recovery 
to its new role as something of a promotional tool for the recording industry"); SEGRAVE, 
supra note 70, at 50. 
82. See LEONARD FEIST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POPULAR MUSIC PUBUSHING IN AMERICA 
47 (1980). 
While the American population had swelled [since the 1920s] and its musical 
skills and awareness had grown, sheet music has never regained an economic 
significance in direct ratio to these changes. Where once a single popular 
song frequently sold over one million printed copies, purchase of half that 
number in a country with a trebled population was regarded as a phenomenon 
in the 1970s. 
/d. Interestingly, even the medium of sheet music is adaptable to the digital age. As of this 
writing (Fall 1998), one company, called "Sunhawk," which came to the attention of this 
writer by accident, has developed a sort of "interactive sheet music" in digital format that can 
be bought over the Internet. See Solero and Sunhawk Technology <http://www.sunhawk. 
com!hawk/techfct.html>. 
83. In 1872, zoologist Eadweard Muybridge designed what he called a 
"zoopraxiscope," a rotating disk with still images on it. Viewers would look through a small 
hole at the rotating disk and see a form of animation. Muybridge designed the device to 
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The new-use issue-whether motion pictures made use of and hence 
infringed some preexisting copyrighted work-appears not to have arisen in 
the early days of the industry. Most likely, the absence of major new-use 
infringement questions can be attributed to the fact that movies, at first, did 
not record or make use of some already copyrightable works in the way that 
the phonograph made use of already copyrightable music. In addition, not 
until the mid-1920s was sound added to motion pictures; necessarily, the use 
of music or other sounds on films as a possible new-use copyright 
infringement would not arise before that time. 85 
Indeed, for the first ten or so years of development, most motion 
pictures were recordings of live events and scenes,86 which are not 
copyrightable. The early years of motion picture performance in one 
American city, Rochester, New York, for example, featured films of 
wrestling matches, dancing performances, horse racing, railroad trains 
entering a station, "a tub race, the coronation of the present czar, a 
watermelon match, a Parisian street scene, march of the French school 
children," and other "views": travel scenes from Moscow, Budapest, 
Venice, Dresden, and the United States. 87 Much of the appeal of movies was 
that they brought distant and exotic scenes to one's hometown.88 Not until 
resolve a major controversy of his day: whether all four feet of a horse are ever off the ground 
at the same time when the horse is galloping. M. JACKSON-WRIGLEY & ERIC LEYLAND, THE 
CINEMA 7-8 (1939). By 1885, William Friese-Greene had demonstrated a motion picture 
projected onto a screen. Id. at 6. Thomas Edison's assistant, William Dickson, was 
pioneering many of the advances later credited to Edison himself in the late 1880s. JoHN 
FELL, A HISTORY OF FILMs 10-11 (1979) (source on file with author). 
84. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240 (3d Cir. 1903). 
85. See MITLARD, supra note 81, at 152-55. 
86. For that matter, many early phonograph recordings were of nonmusical events, such 
as lectures, comedy monologues, religious evangelism, and the like. See GELATI, supra note 
72, at 88-89; MITLARD, supra note 81, at 81. In part, tum of the century recording was driven 
by the fact that some sounds reproduced much better than others: banjo sounds, for example, 
were much easier to reproduce than violin sounds, and male voices could more easily be 
reproduced than female voices. MITLARD, supra note 81, at 81. Unlike motion picture 
technology, however, sound recordings required considerable equipment and typically were 
done in a recording studio. 
87. GEORGE C. PRAIT, "No Magic, No Mystery, No Sleight of Hand": The First Ten 
Years of Motion Pictures in Rochester, in "IMAGE" ON THE ART AND EVOLUTION OF THE FILM: 
PHOTOGRAPHS AND ARTICLES FROM THE MAGAZINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MUSEUM OF 
PHOTOGRAPHY 39, 39-42 (Marshall Deutelbaum, ed., 1979) (quoting a contemporaneous 
newspaper account). 
88. See KRisTIN THOMPSON & DAVID BORDWELL, FILM HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION 12 
(1994) (stating "most [film] subjects were nonfiction, or 'actualities.' These might be 
'scenics,' or short travelogues, offering views of distant lands") (source on file with 
author). Films like this were only a minute or two long. Films were widely offered for rental 
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some years' worth of these vignettes had passed and the public's attention 
had begun to wane did motion pictures as a vehicle for dramatic storytelling 
come to the fore. After years of frequent showings of the travel oriented 
"views," for example, the city of Rochester went near~ two years, between 
1901 and 1903, with no motion picture showings at all. 9 At that point, films 
"were still in danger of permanent extinction . . . . Their rescue came single 
handedly from the introduction and advance of the 'story' 
film ... comprising a series of scenes related to a central character or group 
of characters."90 
The first "stories" told were, perhaps not surprisingly, adaptations of 
stage dramas. Two notable films of this period are often cited as turning 
points in motion pictures' history, Edison Films' The Great Train Robbery 
in 1903, and D.W. Griffith's The Birth of a Nation in 1915. The former 
film was based on a road show drama of the same name,91 while Griffith's 
was based on a 1905 play, The Clansman.92 
When motion pictures became a vehicle for the adaptation of stage 
plays, the first new-use issue involving motion pictures arose. Toward the 
end of the century, publisher Harper & Brothers had bought the copyright to 
a recent popular novel by General Lew Wallace, Ben Hur, for the purpose of 
"dramatizing" the novel as that term was then used: making a stage 
play. Around the same time the Kalem Company decided to make a motion 
picture of the Wallace novel, hiring a writer to develop what today we would 
call a screenplay. It then made the film from the screenplay and licensed 
theaters to show it. Harper & Brothers brought suit.93 
At that time, dramatic works themselves had been explicit 
copyrightable subject matter for about thirty-five years-since 1856-long 
before motion pictures had been invented.94 When the right to "dramatize" 
in film catalogs, such as those of the American Mutoscope and Biograph company in 1902, 
which classified its films as "'Comedy, Vaudeville, Trick, Sports and Pastimes, Notable 
Personages, Railroads, Scenic, Fire and Police, Military, Parades, Marine, Children, 
Educational, Expositions, Machinery, Miscellaneous."' DAVID ROBINSON, FROM PEEP SHOW 
TO PALACE: THE BmTH OF AMERICAN Fn.M 71 (1996) (quoting the American Mutoscope and 
Biograph catalogue), a litany strongly suggestive of nonfiction content. Exceptions were 
notable: Parisian Georges Melies "transformed the cinema into a narrative 
medium ... creating [around 1900] his own fantasy universe at a time when most .filmmakers 
were still content simply to photograph the world as it appeared before them." /d. at 74-75 
(emphasis added). 
89. PRATI, supra note 87, at 52. 
90. !d. at 52. 
91. ROBINSON, supra note 88, at 81. 
92. PRATI, supra note 87, at 46. 
93. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 60 (1911) [hereinafter Kalem II]. 
94. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1133 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552). 
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an existing nondramatic work was added in 1891,95 it encompassed only 
stage plays: although motion picture research was well underway by 1891, 
the first public showing of a motion picture was not unti11895.96 
The district court found for the plaintiff, Harper & Brothers.97 The 
Second Circuit heard the first appeal and concluded that Kalem had indeed 
infringed Harper's right to dramatize the novel.98 The court determined that 
showing a film was the same as putting on a play.99 Kalem apparently 
argued that a play contained spoken dialog and that its movie was, like other 
movies of the day, a silent fllm.100 This sort of factual distinction seems 
wholly irrelevant today, and struck the court as not much more even then: 
live dramatic productions include pantomime, noted the court, so that the 
absence of sound in a movie simply made the movie like a pantomime. 101 
Kalem also argued that it could not be an infringer because it had taken 
only the novel's ideas, not its "writing."102 Today we might look on this as 
/d. 
The act of August 18, 1856 (11 Stat. 138), provides, that any copyright 
thereafter granted under the laws of the United States, "to the author or 
proprietor of any dramatic composition, designed or suited for public 
representation, shall be deemed and taken to confer upon the said author or 
proprietor, his heirs and assigns, along with the sole right to print and publish 
the said composition, the sole right also to act, perform, or represent the same, 
or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public 
place, during the whole period for which the copyright is obtained." 
95. Today we know the right at issue as the broader one of either controlling the 
making of "derivative works" or the making of a "public performance" of the work under 
section 106 of the United States Code. 
96. ALBERT R. FuLTON, MOTION PICTURES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ART FROM SilENT 
Fll.MSTOTiiEAGEOFTELEVISION (Norman ed., 1960). 
97. Harper & Bros v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1909) [hereinafter Kaleml]. 
"A final decree granting a perpetual injunction was entered in the court below, from which 
this appeal is taken." /d. 
98. /d. at 63. "When the film is put on an exhibiting machine, which reproduces the 
action of the actors and animals, we think it does become a dramatization, and infringes the 
exclusive right of the owner of the copyrighted book to dramatize it .... " /d. 
99. /d. 
100. See Kalem I, 169 F. at 64. 
101. /d. 
102. /d. In the Supreme Court, Kalem also argued that motion pictures are just part of 
a machine and hence could not infringe copyrights. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 58. 'The exhibition 
of the pictures, arranged upon a film which is, during all the time of its use, a part of a 
machine, is not an infringement of the book copyright." /d. The ·~ust-part-of-a-machine" 
argument followed arguments made earlier that piano rolls did not infringe copyright. See 
Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888) (stating "I cannot convince 
myself that these perforated strips of paper are copies of sheet music, within the meaning of 
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the familiar argument that copyright protects only "expressions" of ideas, not 
the actual ideas themselves. But the court viewed the argument more as 
going to a combination of subject matter and infringement: can a movie 
made from a novel itself be a "writing" and hence infringe the rights in the 
novel?103 The court misunderstood the nature of infringement, which does 
not depend on the infringing work being itself copyrightable, 104 but no 
matter: the court concluded that the Constitutional term "writing" had over 
the years been broadly applied to paintings, statutes, etc.l and so was not 
offended by being extended to cover "film dramatizations." 05 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit in an opinion by 
Justice Holmes issued in 1911.106 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Supreme 
Court understood that the issue was not the copyrightability of the 
film. More precisely, where the appeals court had seemed to think that 
infringement by the film depended on the film itself sustaining a copyright 
(being considered a "writing"), the Supreme Court noted that the film's own 
copyrightabili~ had nothing to do with escaping the charge of 
infringement.1 But like the Second Circuit, even the Supreme Court 
focused on the matter of the movie's silence as being the touchstone of the 
question whether it could be a dramatization.108 Again, the familiar analogy 
of pantomime carried the day, with the Supreme Court finding only a slight 
and legally insignificant difference between a "live" pantomime and a filmed 
one: 
We are of opinion that Ben Hur was dramatized by what was 
done .... Action can tell a story, display all the most vivid 
relations between men, and depict every kind of human emotion, 
without the aid of a word. It would be impossible to deny the title 
of drama to pantomime as played by masters of the art. Daly v. 
the copyright law. They are not made to be addressed to the eye as sheet music, but they form 
part of a machine"); see also White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I, 7 
(1908) (stating "[t]hings intended for mechanical function-for use in themselves-will not 
infringe copyright .... ") (argument of Charles S. Burton and John J. O'Connell, counsel for 
defendant player-piano manufacturer Apollo Company). It also foreshadowed similar 
arguments raised nearly a hundred years later over computer programs in read-only memory, 
in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating 
"[d]efendant argues that there can be no copyright protection for the ROMs because they are 
utilitarian objects or machine parts"). However, these arguments had little effect in Kalem II. 
103. See Kalem /, 169 F. at 65. 
104. /d. at 63. 
105. /d. at 64-65. 
106. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 63. 
107. /d. at 62. 
108. /d. 
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Palmer, 6 Blatchf. 256, 264. But if a pantomime of Ben Hur 
would be a dramatizing of Ben Hur, it would be none the less so 
that it was exhibited to the audience by reflection from a glass and 
not by direct vision of the figures-as sometimes has been done in 
order to produce ghostly or inexplicable effects. The essence of 
the matter in the case last supposed is not the mechanism employed 
but that we see the event or story lived.109 
683 
The Court reached past superficial arguments to see "the essence of the 
matter" without being distracted by a focus on the "mechanism 
employed."110 Perhaps this was a mild retreat from the White-Smith case's 
insistence only three years earlier that copyrifht applied only to the 
mechanism, and not to the essence of the matter.11 In any event, the motion 
picture industry fell under the obligation to pay royalties for stories used and 
nevertheless rapidly grew to become the major economic force it is today. 
C. Cable Television112 
Rural homes in the 1950s, especially those in valleys or on the far side 
of mountains, were often unable to receive television signals clearly. With 
hindsight, it seems a logical improvement for someone to erect a large 
receiving antenna on the top of a mountain and "pipe" the received signal 
along a wire cable to those rural homes. The first term coined for what we 
call "cable television" today was "CATV," which stood for "Community 
109. Id. at 61. The actual basis of the motion picture studio's liability for 
"dramatization" of the novel in theaters-under the control of independent contractors-was 
the doctrine of contributory infringement. 
The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its 
films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous 
purpose for which they could be used, and the one for which especially they 
were made. If the defendant did not contribute to the infringement it is 
impossible to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on 
principles recognized in every part of the law. 
I d. at 62-63 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
110. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 61. 
111. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
112. Much of the discussion of cable television is drawn from HARDY I, supra note 8, at 
252-56 and from I. Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM "Copies": Hit or Myth? Historical 
Perspectives on Caching as a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L. 
REv. 423, 442-46 (1997) [hereinafter Hardy IT]. 
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Antenna Television."113 Quite simple in concept, the idea of bringing 
television signals over a wire instead of through the air was novel. But it 
was successful, and the cable industry began to grow~ 
Not surprisingly, the copyright owners of the television programs being 
picked up by cable receiving antennas and transmitted to additional homes 
began to demand royalty payments from the cable companies. These 
demands were refused; lawsuits for copyright infringement followed shortly 
thereafter. Two similar cases involving these facts reached the United States 
Supreme Court a few years apart, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc.114 and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc. 115 
The issue in both cases was whether a cable station that, without 
authorization, received and further transmitted a copyrighted program should 
be held to be a copyright infringer.116 Plaintiffs theory was that such a 
transmission constituted a "performance" of the copyrighted works. 117 As 
the performances were to the public and for profit (cable companies were 
not, to put it in Justice Holmes's famous words, "eleemosynary" 
institutions)118 and were accomplished without permission or royalties, 
plaintiffs argued that the cable stations infringed their copyright rights.119 
The defendant cable companies argued, quite straightforwardly, that merely 
by picking up a signal and passing it on, they did not "perform" anything.120 The 
Supreme Court found for the defendant cable companies, determining that cable 
systems did not "perform" the shows they transmitted.121 This conclusion was 
113. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391 
(1968). See also MARY AucE MAYER PHILUPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA 
TELEVISION 4 (1972). 
114. 392 u.s. 390 (1968). 
115. 415 u.s. 394 (1974). 
116. Fortnightly dealt with broadcast signals picked up from the local area and 
transmitted over cable. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 
(1968). Teleprompter dealt with broadcast signals picked up from distant markets. 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). For purposes of the 
discussion in this article, both raise the same issues. 
117. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 402. 
118. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594 (1917). One early cable system was 
created by John Walson, part owner of an appliance store, in 1948 to boost sales of television 
sets in the local, rural area. PHILUPs, supra note 113, at 8-9. Initially given away, this cable 
service proved so popular that the very next year, 1949, Walson began charging a $100 
installation fee and two dollars per month. Id. 
119. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 390; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 404. 
120. 'The petitioner maintains that its CATV systems did not 'perform' the copyrighted 
works at all." Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395. 
121. Id. at 402. 
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founded largely on the reasoning that cable companies were merely passive 
carriers122 that did not rise to the level of "performing" in the ordinary sense of 
that tenn----or as the Court put it, ''Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not 
perform."123 The Court viewed cable as merely an extension of broadcast 
television, of little economic or other significance in itself.124 ''Essentially, a 
CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to receive the 
broadcaster's signals .... "125 Cable systems 
"have nothing to do with sponsors, program content or 
arrangement. They sell community antenna service to a segment of 
the public for which [broadcasters'] programs were intended but 
which is not able, because of location or topographical condition, 
to receive them without rebroadcast or other relay service by 
• ,126 
commumty antennae .... 
In other words, the Court saw cable television functioning mainly to promote 
some other already paid for medium-in this case, broadcast television-in 
much the same way that phonograph recordings were first seen as merely 
. h . 127 promotmg s eet mustc. · 
122. Note that the cable companies were not "passive carriers" as that term is often 
used in connection with telephone companies or Internet Service Providers. In the latter 
cases, the carrier is in a contractual relation with the sender of the information in 
question. With the cable companies, there was no contractual relation with the sender-the 
broadcasting companies-at all. In addition, cable companies have the ability to choose what 
signals to receive and retransmit, and to what audiences they will perform the retransmission. 
123. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398 (citation omitted). The Court announced that it 
would not simply look to the ordinary meaning of the word "perform," noting instead that 
[a]t the outset it is clear that the petitioner's systems did not "perform" 
the respondent's copyrighted works in any conventional sense of that term, or 
in any manner envisaged by the Congress that enacted the law in 1909. But 
our inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history .... 
Id. at 395 (citations omitted). But in fact, the majority opinion largely did limit itself to 
ordinary meaning, especially in concluding that: "Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not 
perform. Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total television 
process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as active performer; the other, as 
passive beneficiary." Id. at 398-99 (citations omitted). 
124. !d. at 399. 
125. Id. See also id. at 400 (where the court stated "[b]roadcasters procure programs 
and propagate them to the public; CATV systems receive programs that have been released to 
the public and carry them by private channels to additional viewers"). 
126. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400 n.28 (quoting Intermountain Broad. & Television 
Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp 315,325 (D. Idaho 1961)). 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72. 
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Just as Congress was shortsighted in its assessment of recorded music a 
generation earlier, so the Supreme Court was dramatically shortsighted in its 
assessment of the significance of cable television. Far from remaining 
merely an adjunct to broadcast television, by the time Congress was revising 
the Copyright Act in the mid-1970s, the cable industry was a major 
economic force: nearly 3500 cable operators served 7700 communities, 
reaching 10.8 million homes and earning revenues of $770 million.128 Cable 
was well beyond the point of simply extending existing broadcast signals to 
a wider and rural audience. It had become an alternative network, competing 
with broadcast networks129-and for that matter, ~owing much more rapidly 
in urban, affluent areas than among the rural poor. 130 
In a replay of what had happened with recorded sound a generation 
earlier when Congress debated the protection of musical compositions 
against the backdrop of a negative Supreme Court ruling, near endless 
Congressional debates131 over cable television's copyright obligations arose 
against the backdrop of a negative Supreme Court ruling. In the end, as with 
the phonograph, a compromise was reached: Cable companies would pay a 
royalty, but the royalty would be fixed by Coniess, and copyright owners 
would have no choice but to accept that royalty.1 2 
D. Current New-Use Issues 
The Internet has begun a new round of new-use issues. One such issue 
is whether audio and video sent over the Internet infringe any copyright 
rights. Digitizing audio or video signals-whether live or recorded-is quite 
simple with today' s computers. Once digitized and resident on a computer's 
hard disk, these digital files can be set up to be played on demand. A 
number of new uses have appeared that depend on this digitizing 
capability. One innovative company developed a technique to play digitized 
music files over a telephone line as a customized aural greeting, in the 
process fulfilling one of Alexander Graham Bell's predictions about the 
128. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 88 (1976). 
129. PAUL GOlDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE, § 5.8.2 at p. 642 
(1996). 
130. See Phillips, supra note 113, at 171-72 (stating: "Industry leaders have recently 
expressed concern for a neglected sector of the American public-the rural dweller'') 
(emphasis added; statement published in 1972). 
131. See Litman, supra note 7, at 332 (stating "[i]t took eleven years and the combined 
efforts of the Copyright Office, the bar associations, the House and Senate Subcommittees, the 
FCC, and the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy to force interested parties to 
reach an agreement on the revision bill's treatment of cable television"). 
132. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 
CORNELLL. REV. 857 (1987). See also 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994). 
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telephone's use for music some hundred years after he first made it.133 A 
trade association representing music recording companies, the Recording 
Industry Association of America ("RIAA"), filed suit against this telephone 
music provider in early 1996 and soon thereafter a settlement was reached in 
which the defendant company agreed to stop making this use of copyrighted 
music.134 As a settlement, of course, this proceeding did not establish that 
the new-use in question was infringing, though that seems likely to have 
been the outcome had the matter continued to trial. 
Many Internet sites make recorded music available on demand over the 
Internet. Apparently these sites, at least initially, did not obtain licenses for 
their distributions. The RIAA sent a cease-and-desist letter to one such site, 
then called AudioNet.com, in early 1996 for exactly that activity.135 The 
site-since renamed broadcast.com-has apparently removed the allegedly 
infringin~ materials and claims to have licensed the materials it continues to 
provide.1 6 This same site provides links to live radio and television 
broadcasts, as well as various concerts and other audio and video 
events. This author is not aware of any conclusive legal determination that 
133. See LEWIS COE, THE 'TELEPHONE AND ITS SEVERAL INVENTORS: A HISTORY 78 
(1995). 
134. See Recording Industry Association of America, Nine Record Companies Reach 
Settlement In Infringement Action <http://www.riaa.com/antipir/ releases/nine.htm> (stating 
Send-A-Song operates a commercial service for customers to order particular 
recordings to be played over the telephone, accompanied by a personal 
message, in the form of an "aural greeting card." Prior to the settlement, 
Send-A-Song made copies of the plaintiffs' sound recordings without the 
plaintiffs' consent, stored them in Send-A-Song's computers, and then 
transmitted these copies over the telephone to the recipients of Send-A-
Song's services). 
135. See Recording Industry Association of America, RIM Demands Internet Service 
Stop Violating Record Companies' Rights <http://www.riaa.com/antipir/releases/rights.htm>. 
136. See broadcast. com, Tenns and Conditions <http://www.broadcast.com/about/ 
terms.html> (stating "[a]ll material on this site, including but not limited to images, 
illustrations, audio clips, and video clips, is protected by copyrights which are owned and 
controlled by broadcast.com or by other parties that have licensed their material to 
broadcast.com") (emphasis added); Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA 
Releases Midyear Anti-Piracy Stats: CD Seizures, Dominated by Bootlegs, Increase 
Astronomically and Overtake Cassette Seizures <http://www.riaa.com/antipir/releases/ 
midstats.htm> (stating: 
the RIAA demanded an Internet service stop violating record companies' 
rights when it sent a cease and desist letter to AudioNet. The company was 
providing an interactive service that offered 400 digital performances of full-
length albums from a variety of musical genres, without the authority of many 
of the various sound recording copyright owners. AudioNet dropped all the 
infringing works within days). 
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such Internet live "broadcasts" infringe copyrights, so technically this new-
use issue remains an open question. Nonetheless, the brief dispute with the 
RIAA and even the name change to broadcast.com certainly suggest that the 
site regards itself as a kind of broadcasting station, presumably subject to the 
same copyright rules as other more traditional broadcasters like radio and 
television. 
V. NEWUSES: ANALYSIS 
When new technologies raise the new-use issue, the debate unfolds in a 
surprisingly predictable way. Whatever the forum, whether in congressional 
hearings or in court, representatives of authors and composers and those 
who, like publishers and distributors, are allied with those interests appear 
on one side. These parties tend to stress that copyright has long 
accommodated new technologies, that Congress intended to protect works of 
authorship in general, and that authors make little enough money as it is such 
that they need all the incentives that a new technology can give them; and 
consequently, that Congress ought to ensure that the new technology falls 
under a full regime of copyright liability applicable to existing technologies. 
Opposing these arguments will be representatives of user groups: the 
owners of the new technology like radio that enables the new-use of others' 
copyrighted works, along with perhaps libraries, schools, research 
organizations, or the like. These parties concentrate their arguments either 
on a narrow reading of the statute as not applicable to the technology, or on 
the broader and more appealing argument that the new technology deserves a 
chance to grow without the encumbrance of exposure to copyright liability, 
or that the new-use of copyrighted works merely advertises the old use and 
as an affirmative benefit to copyright owners should not be held to infringe 
the existing works. 
The arguments on both sides encompass two important policy 
considerations: the benefits of giving new technologies "room to grow" by 
not encumbering them with full copyright liability; and the benefits of 
ensuring that as a technology grows to become economically significant, 
those who create works of authorship for it will have an adequate incentive 
to continue their creative efforts. Sometimes the "no encumbrance" side of 
this argument has won out, as happened in the Supreme Court's decisions 
that cable television did not have to pay royalties to the creators of broadcast 
television programs.137 At other times the reverse has been true, as happened 
137. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
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when courts decided that radio broadcasters did have to pay royalties for the 
copyrighted material they broadcast.138 
The argument that a new-use merely "advertises" an old use and hence 
should not be held to infringe is a particularly familiar one and leads 
naturally into the heart of this article's analysis of the new-use 
issue. Representatives of the phonograph recording industries in the 1900s 
strongly argued to Congress that records merely served as advertising for the 
sheet music market;139 the producers of the motion picture Ben Hur argued 
before the Supreme Court that their movie would benefit sales of the 
book;140 radio station owners in the 1920s argued to Congress that radio 
served mainly to advertise the sales of sheet music;141 library photocopying 
of journal articles in the 1950s and 1960s was described by some as 
primarily a beneficial advertisement for the journals;142 the Supreme Court 
found that cable television in the late 1960s merely promoted broadcast 
television; 143 representatives of an Internet news site argued that "framing" 
others' web sites benefited the sites framed;144 the owner of an Internet site 
celebrating widely available digitized music over the Internet argued that the 
availabili~ of such music benefited the bands whose music was thus made 
available. 45 · 
138. See e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780 (D.N.J. 
1923). 
139. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
140. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 57 (1911). "Not only is there no evidence here that the 
copyright proprietors were injured even in the slightest degree; but, on the contrary, the 
defendant asserted by letter that its films would benefit the complainants, and this they did not 
deny, but stood upon their naked assertion of legal right." /d. 
141. See To Amend the Copyright Act: Hearings on S. 2600 Before the Subcomm. of 
the Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 31-32 (1924) (statement of Charles H. Tuttle of the 
National Association of Broadcasters). 
142. John C. Koepke, Assessment of Documentation Practices in Reprography, IN 
REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHt' LAW 50, ·53 (Lowell H. Hattery & George P. Bush eds., 1964) 
(stating: 
The small journal will tell you that photoduplication actually increases its 
circulation rather than decreases it .... We have talked to many librarians 
who have told us that, after seven or eight requests for an article that may 
have appeared in a rather obscure journal, they have found it desirable to 
begin to subscribe to the journal .... ). 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 123-127. 
144. DavidS. Hilzenrath, Online Publishers Wage a Battle Over Frame and Fortune, 
'!HE WASH. PoST, Feb. 11, 1997, at D4. "'A lot of news organizations are very pleased by 
what [TotaiNews is] doing,' because TotalNews generates more visitors to their sites, said 
Lisa Farringer, a Washington attorney representing TotalNews." /d. (emphasis omitted). 
145. See Michael Robertson, Artists Use MP3 To Reach More Fans, Sell More CDs 
<http://www.mp3.com/news/088.html> (stating: 
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On their face, these advertising arguments make no sense. Even when 
the arguments are true-and it has often been true that a new-use of 
copyrighted works does promote the sales of an existing format146-nothing 
in copyright policy supports the obliging of authors to advertise their 
creativity, and certainly not obliging them to advertise on terms and in places 
that they may not desire.147 If authors have a right to object to others' 
advertising their works, in circumstances where withholding their objections 
would benefit them, then the authors will simJ?Jy withhold their objections in 
order to gain the benefits of the advertising. 1 After all, novelists have the 
One strategy for artists to consider is to seed the Internet with one or more 
songs. This enables music listeners to get a taste of an artist's style or a 
sample from a CD. If they like what they hear they will spread the music and 
a percentage will buy the CD). 
The term "MP3" refers to a type of data compression technology that is especially suited to 
compressing digital music files. 
146. The music business has been particularly attuned to the desirability of advertising 
music through new uses, from vaudeville and phonograph records, which initially advertised 
sheet music sales, to radio, which advertised first sheet music sales then phonograph record 
sales and now CDs. See generally SEGRAVE, supra note 70; see also id. at 13, 37, 51 
(vaudeville advertising sheet music, radio advertising sheet music, and radio advertising 
records). The number of new bands that voluntarily permit their music to be digitized and 
available on the World Wide Web today suggests that these bands find the new-use of Internet 
broadcasting to be valuable advertising. One popular music download site, 
<http://www.mp3.com>, claimed that "MP3.com is the #1 music download site on the 
Internet, with 3,000,000 visitors per month. In the past year, MP3.com has facilitated more 
than 5,000,000 legal, original song downloads-approximately 75,000 songs daily." Michael 
Robertson, Platinwn Entertainment Offers Free MP3 Downloads Via MP3.Com 
<http://www.mp3.com/news/123.html>. 
147. Accord M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 779-80 (D.N.J. 
1923). 
!d. 
There is another point which, although striking us as immaterial, 
deserves some comment. The defendant argues that the plaintiff should not 
complain of the broadcasting of its song because of the great advertising 
service thereby accorded the copyrighted number. Our own opinion of the 
possibilities of advertising by radio leads us to the belief that the broadcasting 
of a newly copyrighted musical composition would greatly enhance the sales 
of the printed sheet. But the copyright owners and the music publishers 
themselves are perhaps the best judges of the method of popularizing musical 
selections. There may be various methods of bringing them to the attention of 
music lovers. It may be that one type of song is treated differently than a song 
of another type. But, be that as it may, the method, we think, is the privilege 
of the owner. He has the exclusive right to publish and vend, as well as to 
perform. 
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right to object to someone else's publishing their novels, yet most novelists 
are all too eager to waive that right in return for that very publication. That 
is how copyright law works. _ 
Behind these nonsensical facial arguments about advertising, we can 
discover a much more principled assertion that focuses on authors' 
incentives to create. In copyright terms, the advertising argument can be 
understood as saying that because a particular new-use benefits copyright 
authors, those authors do not need any further incentive to create for the 
new-use medium. If they need no further incentive, then imposing 
infringement liability for the new-uses merely penalizes the public by 
requiring them to pay for something that would have been created and 
available for free anyway.149 
148. In the June 1906 hearings on what became the 1909 Copyright Act, the testimony 
of witness Paul Cromelin of the Columbia Phonograph Company, went for pages and pages, 
with numerous quoted letters from others to him, all designed to convince Congress that 
phonograph record sales did indeed benefit music composers through the sale of sheet 
music. At one point, Mr. Cromelin was interrupted by Representative John Chaney, who 
asked how the granting of a right to composers to control recordings would make any 
difference to that state of affairs: 
MR. CHANEY. Let me ask you this question: There is not very much doubt 
but what your theory of this is all right-that all these people [i.e., 
composers] want to get their music before the public, and they are seeking 
every means of advertising it. Now, in this bill, should it pass [and give 
composers the right to demand royalties from recording], is there anything to 
prevent that continuing, and, if so, what is it that would interfere with it? 
See BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Hat 333. 
At which point Cromelin appeared mildly flustered and was saved when another 
witness, attorney Albert H. Walker, quickly steered the discussion to other concerns, namely 
that music publishers, acting on behalf of composers, would all sign exclusive contracts with a 
single manufacturer of piano rolls, the iEolian Company, and hence create an unstoppable 
monopoly: 
MR. WALKER. [A]s soon as the iEolian contract goes into effect the 
[music] publishers will no longer be at liberty to send these pieces to Mr. 
Cromelin, and will be under an ironclad contract running for thirty-five years 
to sell them to the iEolian Company only. 
See id. at 334. 
The arguments that music publishers would tie up composers in a web of exclusive 
contracts, and that such exclusive arrangements constituted a harmful monopoly, seem a bit 
hypocritical: recording companies like Cromelin's routinely signed exclusive contracts with 
perfonners, contracts that at times included royalty payments based on the sales of the 
records. See id. at 215-17 (testimony from various parties concerning recording companies' 
exclusive contracts with certain performers). 
149. See, e.g., GolDSTEIN, supra note 129, § 1.14 at p. 1:40 (noting the argument that 
''To give greater property rights than are needed to obtain the desired quantity and quality of 
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Even understood in this more principled way, the arguments about 
advertising and authors' incentives miss the mark. The question is not 
whether an incentive is necessary when works of authorship like music 
already exist and a technology like the phonograph, radio, cable television, 
or the Internet is new. At its earliest stages-say, on the date of its first 
invention-a new-use technology will obviously not have an effect on 
authors' incentives. It would be silly to suggest that the day Edison first 
achieved the playback of a recorded sound or the Internet first transmitted an 
audio file of music, music composers everywhere suddenly had a need for an 
additional royalty incentive in order to continue composing. 
Obviously the day of invention-even if it could clearly be identified-
is too soon to look at the question of a new technology's effects on copyright 
incentives. We should instead ask: will this new-use technology grow in 
economic importance, at some point in the future, to the point that not 
imposing royalty obligations on it would seriously diminish authors' 
incentives to create? If that point never comes, then we should never impose 
royalty obligations on the new-use. If it does come, then we should. 
Determining the "right" degree of incentives, let alone when they 
become necessary, is an issue fraught with difficulty. Rather than undertake 
that task, we can make a simplifying assumption. Let us assume for 
purposes of analysis that at the time a new-use technology arises, the 
existing copyright incentives are already at the "right"-the necessary and 
appropriate-level for all other technologies and uses. That is, instead of 
trying to calculate a measure of incentives and asking when authorial 
incentives in the aggregate, from all possible uses of copyrighted works, 
have reached or deviated from the "right" level, we can instead ask the easier 
question of when, if ever, will current incentives decline because of a new-
use technology? By assuming that current incentives are at the "right" level 
to start with, if we can determine a point at which they decline from that 
level, then we have determined the point at which incentives need to be 
added to bring authorial creativity back up to the "right" level. 
In short, we can focus on displacement: will a new-use technology 
eventually displace existing uses of copyrighted works-the uses that do 
generate royalty income and hence provide a present incentive? If the new-
use industry ends up displacing present forms of copyright exploitation, then 
works would impose costs on users without any countervailing benefits to society") /d. 
(footnotes omitted); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. 
L. REv. 19, 31-32 n.43 (1996) (stating "it is conventional to argue that copyright holders 
should receive only such incentives as are necessary to impel them to create and disseminate 
new works") (citation omitted); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 
1610 (1982) (stating "[c]opyright ... create[s] ownership rights in intellectual property, with 
the primary goal of generating monetary incentives for the production of creative works"). 
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a new incentive in the form of royalties from the new industry's use will be 
needed. If it does not ever displace present-day forms of exploitation, then a 
new incentive will not be needed. 
The problem, of course, is that without foresight, neither Congress nor 
the courts can know which growth path a new-use industry is likely to 
follow. Will the new-use remain forever an aside to some existing market, 
potentially150 only a minor source of income to copyright owners because the 
primary sources are not displaced; or will it outgrow and dominate that 
existing market, displacing it to become a major source of income for 
copyright owners; or something in between? 
The short and accurate answer is "no one knows." But this situation is a 
classic case of the need for a decision maker - court or Congress - to 
make decisions under uncertainty; techniques exist to help us in that 
effort. The decision maker will be faced with what statisticians call "Type I 
and Type II'' errors.151 The labels themselves mean nothing and provide no 
useful insights into the problem, but they do constitute a kind of shorthand 
that makes further discussion a bit more convenient. The terms are used 
here solely for that reason. A Type I error means that a decision was made 
to do something that need not or should not have been done. A Type ll error 
means that a decision to do something was not made, but should have been. 
In the context of technologies that allow new uses of copyrighted 
works, that cryptic summary means this. A Type I error would be committed 
if a decision-maker decided to impose royalty obligations on a new-use 
industry when royalty payments were unnecessary because the industry was 
destined to remain only marginally important to copyright owners. A Type 
ll error would be committed if the decision-maker concluded that the new-
use industry should not be required to pay royalties, and yet the industry was 
destined to become a major market for copyright owners. 
One way to address the problem of uncertainty in this copyright context 
is to ask which of these two errors is the more likely and the more serious; 
other things being equal, if one error is both more likely and more serious 
than other errors, then that error should be avoided. That is, if one error is 
likely to bring about a greater harm to the public than the other, and the 
decision maker has no independent reason to pick one outcome over the 
other, then the error most likely to cause the greatest harm should be 
avoided. The question of infringement for new uses of existing copyrighted 
works therefore reduces itself to an inquiry as to which harm is likely to be 
greater, a Type I or a Type ll error. 
150. The new-use is only "potentially'' a source of income because whether it is or is 
not an actual source depends on how the copyright issues are decided. 
151. See, e.g., MICHAEL 0. FINKElSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 
124-26 (1990). 
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A Type I Errors 
A Type I error means that a decision is made that the new-use is an 
infringement, and consequently that the copyright owner has a right to 
demand royalties, even though it will eventually prove to be the case that the 
new-use industry does not become a significant market for copyright 
owners. What is the harm from that outcome? 
Two related harms seem possible. First is that a requirement to make 
royalty payments may be enough to stifle the new-use industry, leaving it to 
founder when it might have survived, or perhaps leaving it weakened, 
amounting to less than it might have amounted. We might call this a Type Ia 
error-again, only for convenience; there is no special magic in labels. This 
possibility of this type of error has been indirectly noted in academic 
literature. Professor Jessica Litman has written about the many new 
technologies that have not been required to pay royalties, but instead2 have been allowed to grow up in the "shelter of a copyright exemption."15 This 
view, that being sheltered from royalty obligations fosters and promotes the 
growth of desirable new industries, implies the contrary: that if these new-
use industries had been obligated to pay royalties, they would have been 
stifled or suppressed153-and that would be what this article terms a Type Ia, 
or "suppression" error. 
Perhaps worse, a second type of harm from Type I errors would arise if 
copyright owners were content with their own system of exploiting 
copyrighted works and simply did not want any competition from new 
uses. They might therefore deny a license to the new industry even if the 
industry were willing and could afford to pay a suitable royalty. We can call 
this a Type Ib, or "status quo" error, implying that the existing copyright 
owners and copyright industries are happy with the status ~uo and simply do 
not care to authorize a change by licensing any new uses. 15 
152. Litman, supra note 149, at 29 n.33; see generally id. at 27 (stating "copyright 
shelters and exemptions have, historically, encouraged rapid investment and growth in new 
media of expression"). 
153. Accord Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 166 (1975) 
(Biackmun, J., concurring) (stating "I had hoped, secondarily, that the reasoning of 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter would be limited to CATV. At least in that context the two 
decisions had the arguably desirable effect of protecting an infant industry from a premature 
death") (emphasis added). 
154. Litman, supra note 149, at 25 (stating "[m]ost [current copyright stakeholders] 
would prefer that the new copyright rules for new copyright-affecting technologies be 
designed to enable current stakeholders to retain their dominance in the marketplace") 
(footnotes omitted). 
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B. Type II Errors 
A Type II error means that a decision is made that the new-use is not an 
infringement, even though the industry is destined to become potentially a 
major source of income to copyright owners. What is the harm here? 
Most obviously, the harm is that the lack of royalties from the new 
industry will mean a significant disincentive for authors as the old royalty 
paying industry gradually shrinks in importance. In that event, the public 
will lose the benefit of whatever a greater incentive might have brought. 
Let us take the phonograph record industry as an example. In the early 
days of the industry, the incentives for the creation of musical compositions 
came almost entirely from the sale of sheet music, which dominated the 
market for music in the home.155 Yet eventually the phonograph recording 
industry grew enormous!~ more important in sales and dollar volume than 
the sheet music industry. 56 Had the recording industry been exempt from 
royalty payments, for example, it is most unlikely that composers' income 
from the sale of sheet music would have continued to this day to induce the 
creation of the socially desirable amount of music. 
C. Which Harm is Greater? 
So which harm is the greater, a "Type r· or a ''Type II'' error? The first 
harm from a Type Ia error is that a new-use industry might be suppressed or 
weakened by the obligation to pay royalties. That is only a harm, though, if 
the public would have derived greater total benefits from the new industry's 
presence and strength than its absence-that is, if the new-use industry had 
survived and all other things had been equal. 
Manifestly, however, all other things would not be equal. In particular, 
authors unable to derive revenue from the new-use of their works are worse 
off than they would be if they were able to derive revenue. In a rough sense, 
what the new-use industry gains by not having to pay royalties is offset by 
what authors lose by not receiving royalties.157 Conversely, under the 
opposite copyright liability regime (one of full liability), the new royalty 
revenues that authors can command from the new-use are offset by the 
corresponding increased royalty costs for the new industry. 
In short, we want to maximize the benefits-less the costs-of both old 
and new uses of copyrighted works. A new-use industry strengthened means 
155. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
156. See FEIST, supra note 82 and accompanying quotation. See also the phonograph 
company earnings figures listed supra note 72. 
157. The trade-off will not necessarily be one for one: not all authors entitled to 
demand royalties would demand them, or demand as much as they might. 
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an old use industry weakened. And vice versa. Unless one is committed to 
the proposition that new things are ipso facto superior to old things, 158 one 
cannot say that the stifling of a new-use industry is necessarily bad. So the 
question of the Type I error becomes not just "was the new-use industry 
stifled or weakened," but more precisely "was the new-use industry stifled or 
weakened inappropriately, i.e., to the public's overall detriment?" 
How might the "stifling of an industry to the public's detriment" 
happen? Start with this assumption: Apart from the royalties question, the 
new-use industry would have to bring benefits greater than its costs to 
survive in any event. If it did not earn a profit, it would fail to survive in the 
marketplace. Absent some sort of larger market failure, 159 an individual 
business's or industry's failure would be a socially useful result because it 
would free up resources to be used in more socially desirable ways. If a 
new-use industry brought so little value to the public that it was destined to 
fail even without paying royalties, then the requirement of paying royalties 
might hasten its demise-and that would be a good thing. 
On the other hand, if the new-use industry were so socially beneficial 
that it was destined to earn substantial profits, then an obligation to pay 
royalties within some reasonable range would not be enough to stifle it. At 
least we know that an obligation to pay royalties does not necessarily 
prevent an industry from growing-both radio and television, and for that 
matter, motion pictures, 160 have grown up under such royalty obligations. 
We come to an important conclusion. Whether a new-use industry is 
obliged to pay royalties or not makes the most difference when that new 
158. Cf. Litman, supra note 149, at 27, where Professor Litman appears to hold the 
view that new is ipso facto better than old. (stating "[suppose] we imagined the viewpoint of 
a hypothetical benevolent despot with the goal of promoting exciting new technology"). /d. 
(emphasis added). 
159. "Larger market failure" implies some sort of externality. Pollution is the classic 
negative externality: something that affects others but with effects that are not captured in a 
marketplace transaction and hence not reflected in the price of polluting company's 
product. A firm with uncorrected negative externalities imposes costs on others that the firm 
does not have to bear; that means that the firm might succeed when it "ought" to fail. A firm 
might also generate "positive externalities," or benefits provided to others that the firm cannot 
capture through appropriate pricing of its products. For example, a firm that designed 
especially good looking Internet sites might find their sites used as "teaching aids" or models 
for emulation by aspiring Internet page designers. To the extent that the aspiring designers do 
not themselves pay for the "instruction" they receive from studying the firm's site designs, the 
firm has conferred external benefits on those designers. 
160. See Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 62 (1911) (stating that a motion picture made from a 
novel infringes the novel owner's right to control dramatizations of the novel, even though the 
right of "dramatization" in the statute was enacted at a time before the development of motion 
pictures when stage plays were all that was expressly contemplated). 
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industry is barely profitable. And-again, absent market failures-an 
industry that is barely profitable is one that makes a comparably small 
contribution to society. Finally, that conclusion leads us to a useful rule of 
thumb: If a decision maker makes a Type Ia error, fmding infringement 
liability where the industry is of only slight significance and consequently 
for which the obligation to pay royalties is likely to be a significant factor in 
causing the industry to fail, the magnitude of the error is likely to be quite 
small. 
Now we must address the second type of harm, a Type Ib error: 
Congress or courts impose infringement liability and a corresponding 
obligation to pay royalties in a situation in which authors will refuse to 
license the new-use in order to preserve their existing business. For indus-
tries destined to fail for want of providing any significant public value, we 
are no worse off if copyright owners refuse a license. By hypothesis, a 
copyright owner's refusal to permit licensing merely hastens the demise of 
an nonbeneficial industry, a socially desirable outcome. But for those new-
use industries that might have provided significant value to society, a 
copyright owner's refusal to license would presumably put the new-use 
industry out of business, and that would be harmful to the public. 
Is this outcome likely in practice? Do authors (copyright owners) 
actually refuse to license uses of their works when it would be profitable for 
them to do so? Of course, anything can happen. People can be motivated by 
"irrational" forces: anger, spite, etc. But in the main, one would expect that 
if authors can make money by licensing, they wi11.161 It is in their self-
interest to do so. In other words, the likelihood that authors given both a 
right and a market that permits them to 'demand royalties in some profitable 
amount, would instead refuse royalties in any amount, seems small-far less 
than the likelihood that they would happily receive them. At the very least, 
if one has to make rules that govern most situations, most of the time, one is 
more likely to be right if one predicts that when money can be made, the 
people in a position to make it will try to make it. 
161. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 316 (5th ed. 1998) (stating 
in relation to patents that "it is always more profitable to license production to a more efficient 
pr!)ducer than it is to produce oneself'); ARMEN A. ALcHIAN & WILLIAM R. AllEN, EXCHANGE 
AND PRODUCTION: COMPEITTION, COORDINATION, & CONTROL 292 (3d ed. 1983) (describing 
in relation to patents the fallacy of "a commonplace of modem folklore that gasoline 
producers have a new fuel or carburetor that would enormously reduce the demand for 
gasoline, but to protect their wealth they have withheld the device"); ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND EcoNOMICS 138 (1988) (referring to patents: "[T]he use of a patent 
to suppress an invention is exceedingly unlikely. The far more common case is that the 
licensing of a patent for a fee is much more valuable to the patentee than is the act of not 
revealing an invention"). 
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Summing up, we can see that the harm from a Type Ib error is 
significant, but the likelihood that such an error will be made-in which a 
new-use industry would have prospered, to the public's overall benefit, but 
the relevant authors refused, on economically irrational grounds, to grant a 
license for that use-is low.162 
D. Type II Errors 
A Type IT error means that the new-use industry is found not to infringe 
but is destined to grow in importance to the point that the industry's failure 
to pay royalties will constitute a significant disincentive to authors. What is 
the harm here? 
The obvious harm is that with inadequate incentives, authors create (or 
publishers publish, or distributors distribute, etc.) less than they might have 
and the public is worse off as a result. Is that a likely harm? Surprisingly, 
we have no examples of an important industry that was held to have no 
royalty obligations and for which the lack of obligation persisted throughout 
the industry's history. The examples that would likely have fit that pattern 
all ended up eventually with some form of royalty obligation, frequently in 
the form of a compulsory license. The phonograph and cable television 
certainly fit this model, as did the jukebox until 1993.163 
One might question, then, whether there is any harm at all when a court 
declines to impose infringement liability and hence a royalty obligation on a 
new-use industry. If the industry is destined to remain of little public 
benefit, then the loss of its royalties to authors will not be significant. Yet, if 
the industry does become important, then Congress will act to impose 
compulsory license royalties. That has at least been something of the 
historical pattern. 
The problem with this reasoning is that it assumes two things: first, that 
the royalty obligation (again, typically in the form of a compulsory license) 
will be imposed at about the same time as the industry becomes significant 
enough to justify the requirement and not earlier or later; and second, that 
compulsory licenses-if that is the mechanism-are a desirable way to 
accommodate the royalty obligation. The evidence to date suggests that the 
162. One counterargument is that we do not care about "authors" literally. It is the old 
use industry that matters, the industry that is not an "author" itself but a licensee of 
authors. The counterargument fails, however: New authors arise all the time and have the 
option to transfer their rights to old or new-use industries. To the extent that the old use 
industry is itself the "author" of the works its sells, then the argument in the text holds 
directly. 
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. 1995) (phonorecords); 17 U.S.C. § 11l(c), (d) (1994) 
(cable television); 17 U.S.C. § 116(b) (1988), repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-198, § 3(a), (b)(2), 107 Stat. 2309. 
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first assumption is questionable and that the second is correct only as a 
matter of politics, but certainly incorrect as a matter of economics. 
The first assumption is that a decision to impose infringement liability 
on a new-use industry will not just happen eventually, but will happen at 
roughly the "right" time. The "right" time is the time that the need for an 
incentive to authors arises. If the obligation is imposed later than that, then 
the public will be the poorer for the delay; moreoveu a belated imposition of 
royalties will almost certainly not be retroactive, 1 so that the loss to the 
public is one that can never be repaid. When exactly that time first arises is 
obviously a difficult question to answer. Certainly authors and the new-use 
industry would not agree on the matter: Authors are likely to believe that the 
"right" time for royalty payments is from the beginning, whenever the new-
use first arose; the new-use industry is likely to believe that the right time is 
"never." 
The very difficulty of determining objectively when the right time 
arises, coupled with a strong self-interest on both sides that effectively 
prevents them from having an objective view at all, implies that there is little 
or no incentive in either the legislative or judicial arenas for decision makers 
to discover what the "right" time is for the imposition of a royalty 
obligation. That is, no one in a position to take action-the parties, the 
courts, or Congress-stands to gain by trying to determine the right time for 
royalty imposition. Consequently, one must conclude that when 
infringement liability and a royalty obligation is belatedly imposed on a new-
use industry, the assumption that this imposition will come at the "right 
time" is probably wrong. At the very least, we can say that there is no built-
in incentive for the assumption to be true and hence, no reason to expect the 
timing to be "right." 
The point about economics-that compulsory licenses are wasteful of 
resources-is easier to demonstrate. A compulsory license is a form of price 
fixing: Congress or an agency sets the price for a broad class of 
bargains165-those that deal with the buying and selling of certain copyright 
164. A retroactive imposition of liability would mean this: First, a new-use industry is 
found (by a court or Congress) not to infringe some existing works; second, the new-use 
industry grows in importance to the point that the lack of royalty payments becomes a 
significant disincentive to authors; third, a decision is made (by court or Congress) that the 
new-use industry should pay royalties; and finally, the decision maker extends this new 
royalty obligation to past acts that have already been determined not to infringe. This last step 
seems very likely to be a denial of due process and hence unconstitutional. 
165. For example, for pre-1998 transactions, the license to record a musical 
composition that has already been recorded is set in the statute at "either two and three-fourths 
cents, or one-half of one cent per minute of playing time or fraction thereof, whichever 
amount is larger." 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2) (1994). After 1998, the decision maker shifts from 
Congress to the Copyright Office, which has acquired the authority to establish license prices 
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licenses; the parties have little or no room to change the price term.166 As 
such, a compulsory license has whatever drawbacks price controls 
have. Absent significant market failures, 167 a compulsory license makes for 
a wasteful allocation of social resources. 168 
Compulsory licenses might be justified on two other grounds, 
however. First, that such a license can reflect a Congressional policy 
determination simply to favor one industry or activity over another. For 
example, Congress might decide to favor cable television with compulsory 
license payments that were lower than fair market value precisely to foster 
the growth of cable at the expense of other activities. Whether this is a 
desirable way to create subsidies instead of alternatives like tax deductions 
or outright subsidy payments from general tax revenues is partly a matter of 
politics and political philosophy. 
In addition, there is a possibility that a compulsory license will lower 
transaction costs. This is at times offered as a justification for such 
licenses, 169 but this point is misleading at best. Other things being equal, 
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803 (1994). In the case of cable royalties, the price is based on a 
station's annual revenue and determined from a complex series of conditions. See 17 U.S.C. § 
111(d) (1994). 
166. Under many copyright compulsory license provisions, the statutorily specified 
price serves as a ceiling; the parties may reach agreement for a lower price. See, e.g., 17 
U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1997) (stating "copyright owners of nondramatic musical 
works and any persons entitled to obtain a compulsory license [for cover records] ... may 
negotiate and agree upon the terms and rates of royalty payments"); 17 U.S.C. § 118(b) (1994) 
(stating that owners of copyright in certain musical and other works and "any public 
broadcasting entities, respectively, may negotiate and agree upon the terms and rates of royalty 
payments"). From early on, lesser-known music recordings "covered" by better-known artists 
have in fact received less than the statutory royalty. See SEGRAVE, supra note 70, at 18, 20. 
167. See supra text accompanying note 159. 
168. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable 
Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 77-79 (1981); ALcHIAN & All..EN, supra note 
161, at 62. Note that by hypothesis I am describing a new-use industry that has grown to the 
point where royalties from an "old use" industry have fallen off significantly; consequently, I 
am describing a situation for which a royalty obligation from the new-use industry is 
consistent with overall reliance on copyright as an incentive for the public's benefit. One can 
always assert that Congress is free to deny copyright to any activity and that it can certainly 
extend a limited copyright in the form of compulsory licenses to any activity as well. I do not 
gainsay that point; I am not talking about Congressional power but rather about a situation in 
which anyone who agreed with the fundamental principles of copyright-an incentive for 
creation that redounds to the public's benefit-would agree that a royalty is called for. 
169. Transaction costs were offered as the reason for a statutorily specified compulsory 
license for cable television in the 1976 Copyright Act: "[I]t would be impractical and unduly 
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose 
work was retransmitted by a cable system." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976). 
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price fixing always lowers transaction costs because it avoids the need for 
bargaining. If that were a suitable justification in general, then Congress 
ought to establish prices for every transaction in every market, copyright or 
otherwise. That Congress has never systematically attempted to fix the 
prices of all goods and services in the United States marketplace suggests 
that the transaction cost rationale alone must not in fact be a helpful 
explanation for the existence of compulsory licenses.170 
In any event, there is no evidence in our recent compulsory license 
. . h & • k b 171 bl 1 . . 172 h h provisions sue as 10r JU e oxes, ca e te evision7 p onograp 
recording, 173 public broadcasting, 174 satellite transmissions, 1 5 and others that 
social welfare is improved by that mechanism.176 Whereas there is reason to 
think that the fair use provision-itself a kind of compulsory license that 
operates in situations with additional indications of public benefit-
accomplishes overall socially desirable objectives.177 
Economics aside, it appears that the large number of compulsory 
licenses in copyright law is based on the fact that politically, the compulsory 
license makes a great deal of sense. When a Type IT error is made early on, 
and an industry prospers without liability that should, at some point, be 
obliged to pay royalties, it is politically difficult-perhaps impossible-for 
Congress to switch the industry "cold turkey" from no liability to full 
liability. Nor would that switch be fair to the industry which, after all, has 
relied for its investments on a past decision that its actions did not constitute 
170. See also Hardy II, supra note 112, at 446 (stating "[a] reduction in transaction 
costs through legislation is beneficial only if all sides benefit from the reduction. If one side 
benefits but only to the corresponding detriment of the other side, then Congress has merely 
shifted resources from one side to the other by a form of price-fixing"). 
171. 17 U.S.C. § 116(a) (1988), repealed by Copyright Royalty Reform Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 103-198 § 3, 107 Stat. 2309 (1993). 
172. 17 u.s.c. § 111(d)(1994). 
173. /d. at§ 115. 
174. !d. at§ 118(b)(3). 
175. /d. at§ 119. 
176. Compulsory licensing may at times have even more pernicious and unexpected 
consequences than a simple failure to promote the general welfare. The compulsory licensing 
of recorded music, for example, which takes the form of allowing the making of "cover 
records" without permission, has been said to have encouraged both racism and payola. See 
SEGRAVE, supra note 70, at 18-19 (stating the compulsory licensing of cover records allowed: 
"racism to be more prevalent, especially noticeable in the 1950s when racist radio stations 
refused to play, for example, Little Richard, substituting instead a white cover by Pat 
Boone. [The presence of multiple versions of the same song in] tum has put more pressure on 
companies to dispense payola"). 
177. See Gordon, supra note 149, at 1602. 
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infringement. 178 A compulsory license, then, is often the only compromise 
that can be reached at that stage in the growth of the new-use industry.179 
Finally, whenever a decision about infringement liability reaches 
Congress, one expects a fair amount of lobbying and arguing about the 
outcome. The 1909 Copyright Act hearings, for example, were full of 
witnesses and leng.hy testimony about the issue of phonograph recordings 
and piano rolls. 1 The issue of cable television's copyright liability 
consumed a substantial amount of debate during the 1976 Copyright Act 
revision process-as, for that matter, did nearly every issue! 181 In a sense, 
whenever an important issue like cable television or recorded sound S"!Jrfaces 
in Congress during a revision effort, substantial "transaction costs" are 
entailed in lobbying and testifying. 
The cost of a Type II error, in sum, consists of three parts. First is the 
cost of the public's loss of access to creative expression during the period in 
which the new-use industry should have been paying royalties.182 Second, 
there is the cost of a compulsory license, which is essentially the waste of 
178. For example, see the 1908 arguments of counsel for the Apollo Company (piano 
roll manufacturer), Charles S. Burton and John J. O'Connell, that past court decisions holding 
piano rolls not to infringe musical compositions constituted "prior decisions [that] have 
established a rule of property and of business, and should be sustained under the doctrine of 
stare decisis, unless greater injury would result from sustaining than from reversing them." 
White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I, 7 (1908) (emphasis added); 
Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. 
(1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part J at 289 (statement of FrankL. Dyer, of 
the Edison Manufacturing Company and National Phonograph Company) (stating 
I submit, gentlemen, that a radical change in the law would seriously disturb 
vested interests which have enormously developed under the present 
law. The National Phonograph [company] has a pay roll of over $45,000 per 
week, over 4,000 employees, and makes over 100,000 records and 1,500 
machines daily .... The business has developed under the security of the 
present law .... ). 
179. For useful exposition of the events behind the adoption of the compulsory license 
provision for cable television in the 1979 Copyright Act, see Litman, supra note 7, at 326-
32. See also Darlene A. Cote, Note, Chipping Away at the Copyright Owner's Rights: 
Congress' Continued Reliance on the Compulsory License, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (1994). 
180. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994)). 
181. See Litman, supra note 132, at 857. 
182. I apologize for possibly beating a dead horse, but once again I remind the reader 
that I am talking here about an industry that "should have been paying royalties" because, by 
hypothesis, the industry has grown to the point that its failure to pay royalties constitutes a 
significant loss of incentives to authors and therefore, a loss to the public. 
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resources inherent in any price fixing arrangement.183 And fmally, there is 
the cost of the decision making process when authors line up against a new-
use industry during the process of copyright revision. These include: 
lobbying costs, publicity campaigns, time consumed in Congressional 
hearings by participants, time given up by members of Congress that might 
have been applied to other issues, and whatever other expenses accompany a 
major legislative battle between opposed industry groups.184 
E. Type I and II Errors: Summary 
We can chart the various errors and their harms. As is so often true 
with copyright issues, assessments of the magnitude of harm and its 
frequency from various courses of action are largely subjective; this article 
makes no claim otherwise. With the subjective nature of the following 














Unless the expected frequency of Type Ia errors is extremely high, the 
greatest expected harm from wrong decisions about the infringement liability 
of new-use industries is that of a Type II error. That is, the error we should 
be concerned to avoid is that of failing to impose infringement liability on 
the new-use industry. In turn, this means that-all other things being equal, 
and there being no other basis for a decision-the decision maker faced with 
deciding whether a new-use industry should be obliged to pay royalties will 
more likely be right when deciding "yes" than "no." 
The history of various new technologies sketched out in this article 
tends to confirm this general rule of thumb. The technologies discussed here 
183. There is no requirement that the imposition of a belated royalty obligation take the 
form of a compulsory license with its inefficiencies. It is just that as a practical matter, that 
seems to be the usual course for Congress to take because it reflects a political 
compromise. Note also that one may choose to put a high value on government decision 
making such as price controls for its own sake. From that perspective, the "cost" of a 
compulsory license in poorly allocated resources may perhaps be offset by whatever "gain" 
inheres in the fact that a resource allocation decision was made by Congress rather than 
privately. 
184. See generally Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. 
Cm. LEGAL F. 217,252-58 (1996). 
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that grew to enormous significance in American life have included the 
phonograph and subsequent mechanisms for recording sounds, motion 
pictures, radio, television, cable television, and the Internet. Motion 
pictures, radio, and television were new-use technologies that were subject 
to the usual copyright royalty obligations from the start. All have prospered 
nonetheless. Recorded sound and cable television were not subject to such 
obligations and have evolved under complex and economically wasteful 
compulsory license provisions that have long since outlasted any 
conceivable justification other than the inertia of the status quo. Though 
anything is possible, one would be hard-pressed to conclude that either of 
these latter technologies would have suffered a premature death under 
copyright's usual royalty regime. 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this analysis, at the very least the 
analysis shows what the relevant inquiry is. In particular, the relevant 
inquiry is not merely looking at the new-use industry and its current financial 
health alone, without considering the effects on the old use industries, and 
without taking into account the various possibilities for the new-use 
industry's future growth. Proper decision making about copyright's 
application to new-use technologies requires instead an inquiry into the 
future growth possibilities of the new-use industry and the potential for its 
negative effect on existing copyright using industries. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Copyright law seems never to be caught up with technology, with the 
result that Congress is under constant pressure to amend the Copyright Act 
to bring the law up to date with new developments. At first blush, this need 
for continual amendment is puzzling: Congress expressly tried to make the 
last major revision of copyright laws, adopted in 1976, flexible enough to 
handle future technologies without need for frequent changes. A closer look 
reveals, however, that Congress only solved one of at least four issues that 
almost invariably arise with new technologies. 
Looking back at technological developments over the last century that 
include photography, piano rolls, phonograph recording, motion pictures, 
radio, television, cable television, and the Internet, we can see copyright 
issues emerging in four recognizable patterns: 1) the question of subject 
matter coverage for new media of fixation; 2) the question of subject matter 
coverage for new types of works; 3) the question of decentralized 
infringement; and finally 4) the question of new uses of existing copyrighted 
works. 
We also see a checkered history of courts' and Congress's accom-
modation to these four issues, with the most success accruing to the first 
issue, that of new media of fixation. By and large, the cprrent Copyright 
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Act's focus on intangible "works" as copyright's subject matter reasonably 
well handles new developments in media of expression such as laser disks or 
the like. 
The other issues remain far more problematic. One of the most 
intriguing is the last, that of a new technology that creates a new way of 
using existing copyright works. Frequently, courts and Congress have 
viewed this new-use issue in the wrong light. By focusing on the industries 
and technologies prominent at the time the new-use issue first arises, 
copyright decision makers have tended to assess the royalty obligations of 
the new-use by examining the new technology's effects on existing 
uses. Thus in hearings on the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress clung doggedly 
to the argument that phonograph records would only enhance the "real" 
market, the market for sheet music.185 Radio broadcasters in the 1920s 
argued that radio only enhanced that same market. The Supreme Court in 
the 1970s was strongly swayed by the view that cable television was merely 
an enhancement to the "real" market, the market for broadcast television. 
In none of these cases did the decision maker focus on the more 
important question: Will the new-use industry eventually grow to displace 
today's technologies for exploiting copyrighted material? For if that 
displacement occurs, then authorial incentives will decline unless offset by a 
new royalty stream from the new-use technology. Given that no one can 
predict the future growth of today's technology, copyright decision makers 
should rely instead on an analysis that looks at this question: How bad could 
it be if the decision maker guesses wrongly about the growth of a new-use 
technology? By using the statistical concept of ''Type r• and ''Type ll'' 
errors, this article concludes that, other things being equal, copyright 
decision makers ought to resolve the issue of copyright royalty obligations 
arising from uncertainty about the future of a new-use technology by 
deciding in favor of royalty obligations. 
185. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994)). 
